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The Death of Rules and Standards
A nthony J. C asey & A nthony N iblett ’

Scholars have examined the lawmakers ’choice between rules and standards for dec
ades. This Article, however, explores the possibility o f a new form o f law that renders
that choice unnecessary. Advances in technology (such as big data and artificial in
telligence) will give rise to this new form —the microdirective—which will provide
the benefits o f both rules and standards without the costs o f either.
Lawmakers will be able to use predictive and communication technologies to en
act complex legislative goals that are translated by machines into a vast catalog o f
simple commands fo r all possible scenarios. When an individual citizen faces a legal
choice, the machine will select from the catalog and communicate to that individual
the precise context-specific command (the microdirective) necessaryfo r compliance.
In this way, law will be able to adapt to a wide array o f situations and direct precise
citizen behavior without further legislative or judicial action. A microdirect ive, like
a rule, provides a clear instruction to a citizen on how to comply with the law. But,
like a standard, a microdirective is tailored to and adapts to each and every context.
While predictive technologies such as big data have already introduced a trend
toward personalized default rules, in this Article we suggest that this is only a small
part o f a larger trend toward context-specific laws that can adapt to any situation.
As that trend continues, the fundamental cost trade-off between rules and standards
will disappear, changing the way society structures and thinks about law.
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Introduction

Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of precisely tailored laws,
specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation. The lawmakers
have enough information to anticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws are
perfectly calibrated to their purpose—they are neither over- nor underinclusive. Now
imagine that when a citizen in this world faces a legal decision, she is clearly in
formed of exactly how to comply with every relevant law before she acts. This citizen
does not have to weigh the reasonableness of her actions, nor does she have to search
for the content of a law. She just obeys a simple directive. The laws at work in this
world are not traditional rules and standards. Instead, they take a new form that cap
tures the benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the costs. This new
form— we call it the microdirective— is the future of law.
When lawmakers enact laws today, they must choose between using rules and
using standards to achieve a desired goal.1 This choice requires a trade-off between
certainty and calibration. Rules provide certainty through clear ex ante statements of
the content of the law.2 But rules are costly to design because lawmakers must, at the

1. The trade-off occurs on a particular level. Any given law may use rules for some
components and standards for others. Louis Kaplow. Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 561 n.6 (1992); see John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s
Algorithm, 66 Fla . L. Rev . 991, 1027 (2014) (“[I|n the real world, rules and standards rarely
exist as perfect Platonic forms.”). For demonstrative purposes, we follow convention in
discussing the rules-standards decision as a binary choice.
2. The literature on this distinction is vast. See Ward Farnsworth, T he Legal
A nalyst: A T oolkit For T hinking A bout T he L aw 163-71 (2007); Joseph Raz, P ractical
Reason and N orms (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 C al. L. R ev. 953,
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outset, identity and analyze all the various scenarios to which rules might apply.
Rules can also be imprecise and error prone. Because they are defined ahead of time,
they can be poorly calibrated ' to the events as they actually occur.**345
Standards, on the other hand, are adjudicated after the fact. As a result, lawmakers
avoid high up-front design costs. Moreover, when applied after the fact, standards
can be precisely tailored or calibrated to a specific context as it actually arose.6 But
they also generate ex ante uncertainty because regulated actors do not know up front
whether their behavior will be deemed by the adjudicator to comply with the
standard.6
We suggest that technological advances in predictive and communication tech
nologies will render this trade-off between rules and standards unnecessary. A new
form of law, the microdirective, will emerge to provide all of the benefits of both
rules and standards without the costs of either. These microdirectives will provide ex
ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario.
The first technology to consider is predictive technology. Innovations in big data
and artificial intelligence will make it increasingly easy to predict the outcomes that
certain behavior will produce. Lawmakers will ultimately have the ability to cheaply
gather information and use predictive algorithms and big data to update the law

961-62 (1995); see also Isaac Khrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis o f Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. L egal Stud. 257 (1974); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term - Foreword: The Justices o f Rules and Standards, 106 PlARV. L. R ev. 22 (1992). See
generally Kaplow, supra note 1 (explaining the distinction from an economic perspective);
Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny o f Choice and the Rulification o f Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP.
L egal Issues 803, 803 n.l (2005) (same).
3. We use the term calibration to denote the lit of a law to its legislative purpose. For
example, a fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit may be poorly calibrated because it is too low
when the weather is perfect and the roads are clear and too high when the weather is bad and
the roads are crowded. Another term could be “inclusiveness.” The fifty-live miles-per-hour
speed limit is both under- and overinclusive because it prohibits some desirable behavior
(driving sixty miles per hour on a sunny day) and allows some undesirable behavior (driving
filly miles per hour on a rainy day). See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision o f
Administrative Rules, 93 Y ale L. J. 65, 73-74 (1983) (exploring the costs of rulemaking and
defining under- and overinclusiveness); Kaplow, supra note 1, at 565; McGinnis & Wasick,
supra note 1 at 1030-31; Frederick Schauer, The Convergence o f Rules and Standards, 2003
N.Z. L. Rev. 303, 305-09; Schauer, supra note 2, at 803-04; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 992.
What we call calibration is similar to what Diver calls congruence. Diver, supra, at 67.
4. More formally, in law-and-eeonomics terms, a rule introduces high ex ante decision
and error costs because it is costly to predict and set rules for every possible scenario. See infra
Part LA.
5. This precision is less costly for standards because the adjudicator only has to figure
out the context-specific applications for cases that actually arise, whereas an ex ante rule has
to address all possible applications. See Kaplow, supra note 1. at 562-63; McGinnis & Wasick,
supra note 1, at 1031; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1003-04.
6. Kaplow, supra note I, at 569, 575 n.42, 587-88; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 974-77;
see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2
J.L. Econ . & O rg. 279 (1986) (modeling the costs of uncertain standards); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 I lARV. L. Rev. 1689-701 (1976). Our
comparisons here assume unbiased lawmakers and judges. We discuss bias in Part II.
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instantly based on all relevant factors.7 In effect, this lowers the cost o f designing
precise, finely calibrated laws.
The second technology to consider is communication technology. Ubiquitous and
instantaneous communication capabilities will reduce the uncertainty o f law. From
the vast catalog o f rules generated by predictive technology, communication tech
nology will be able to identity the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform
the regulated actor exactly how to comply with the law.8 It will be able to translate
all the information into a single behavioral directive that individuals can easily
follow.
To see how the mechanism might work, consider the regulation o f traffic speed.
In a world o f rules and standards, a legislature hoping to optimize safety and travel
time could enact a rule (a sixty miles-per-hour speed limit) or a standard (“drive
reasonably”). With microdirectives, however, the law looks quite different. The
legislature merely states its goal. Machines then design the law as a vast catalog o f
context-specific rules to optimize that goal. From this catalog, a specific micro
directive is selected and communicated to a particular driver (perhaps on a dashboard
display) as a precise speed for the specific conditions she faces. For example, a
microdirective might provide a speed limit o f 51.2 miles per hour for a particular
driver with twelve years o f experience on a rainy Tuesday at 3:27 p.m. The legisla
tion remains constant, but the microdirective updates as quickly as conditions
change.
In this Article, we explore whether this example could become the model for law
more broadly. Our long-run prediction is that microdirectives will become the domi
nant form o f law, culminating in the death o f rules and standards. But even if that
full evolution does not happen, microdirectives are certain to become a viable alter
native for many laws. This short-run phenomenon is o f great importance, as even a
limited spread o f microdirectives has the potential to change the way laws are struc
tured and thought about generally.
This advent o f microdirectives may take various paths. In the simplest story, the
legislature uses the new technology and communicates the command to the citizen.
We use this example to illustrate the concept. More realistically, however, the tech
nology will often be implemented at the administrative level by regulators and en
forcement agencies. Lawmakers may still enact standards, but administrative agents
will convert them to microdirectives. A third possibility is that private citizens will
generate the microdirectives. Citizens using private predictive technology may

7. The optimal rate of change in law (from the perspective of social welfare or some
other legislative goal) may be slower. But that optimal rate could be factored in by the
technology. See infra Part 1II.B. Courts currently update standards over the span of many years.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The
Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School
of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 I Iarv. L. R ev. 457 (1897).
8. We define communication function to include two steps. First, there is the
communication of the context of an actual scenario to the machine. Second, there is the
communication of the legal directive from the machine to the individual. See infra Part I.B.
The first step might alternatively be called fact gathering. We lump them together because, in
practice, the technology facilitating the information flow in each direction is likely to be the
same or closely related.
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inform themselves o f the most reasonable action in any particular situation. As that
private technology gets better, two things will happen. First, failure to use the tech
nology will become a per se violation o f a legal standard. And, second, the technol
ogy will be able to predict judicial outcomes. Both effects will result in citizens using
private technology to derive a simple microdirective for how to comply with the law.
For all o f these paths, the result is that laws that look like standards to the legisla
tures will appear as simple and easy-to-follow directives to the regulated individual.
This form o f law is neither a standard nor a rule. It provides the certainty o f a rule
and the calibration o f a standard, with none o f the decision costs associated with
either. Moreover, the law, in application, morphs from a standard (for the legislature)
to a set o f complex rules (within the machine process) to a simple command (for the
citizen).
We describe the rise o f microdirectives as the death o f rules and standards. One
might alternatively frame the coming change simply as the death o f standards. After
all, microdirectives are ex ante rules that govern behavior. The driver in our example
is told exactly how to behave ex ante. In that framing, technology has reduced the
cost o f precise ex ante rule making. Rules will no longer be over- and underinclusive.
As a result, the rationale for using standards goes away. That is consistent with the
conventional law-and-economics definition o f a rule as having ex ante content (rela
tive to the regulated actor). But the lawmakers are not enacting rules. The lawmakers
need not spend the time to prescribe precise rules. They can enact broad standards
and let the machines do the rest. Indeed, from the perspective o f the lawmakers, it is
the death o f rules. The framing is less important than the recognition that micro
directives will change the foundational nature o f law.'*
Our analysis is positive rather than normative. One might think o f perfect calibra
tion o f laws to legislative goals as problematic in a system with multiple branches
and checks and balances. Indeed, our analysis implies a reduced role forjudges and
perhaps the need for institutional reforms to preserve important aspects o f our current
system. Others may view microdirectives as a threat to privacy and autonomy. The
easier it is for the government to learn information about the behavior o f an individ
ual and use technology to predict outcomes, the more the government can
micromanage to achieve desired social results. Finally, some may have concerns
about ethics and moral health in a world where many important decisions are auto
m ated.910 We do not take a side on these normative questions. We do, however, try to
flag the areas where the thorniest normative questions will arise.
The primary contribution o f this Article is to explore the most far-reaching effects

9. This question of framing suggests an interesting semantic deficit in the way legal
academics talk about rules and standards. Readers of our earlier drafts have been equally split
on what it means to call something a rule. Some infer that the label “rule” denotes an ex ante
statement of content from the lawmaker. Others infer that it denotes an ex ante instruction for
the regulated individual, that disconnect does not matter much with traditional lawmaking.
But as microdirectives proliferate, the tension will come to the forefront. As a result, not only
do actual rules and standards die, but so too does the meaningful use of those words to label
the laws that exist.
10. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional
Virtues o f Fog, 123 II arv. L. Rf.v. 1214. 1222, 1244 (2010) (standards provide for ethical
decision making important to moral health).
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of technology on the general structure of law. This contribution builds on and con
nects with two strands in the law-and-technology literature. The first strand looks at
the effects that predictive technology has on the legal services industry." The second
strand looks at the nature of personalized default rules.12
We suggest, however, that these strands understate the momentous effect that the
coming technological revolution will have on law.1’ By connecting the growing lit
erature on technology and the law to the literature on rules and standards, we show
that the same technology that will bring us automated compliance lawyers and per
sonalized default rules will also bring us the microdirective.14 And that change in the
form o f law will have broader consequences than retail personalization of law. In
deed, microdirectives have the potential to bring wholesale institutional changes to
our entire system o f laws and the way we choose to regulate behavior.

11. Some scholars predict the effects of technology on legal services. Richard S usskind,
T he E nd of L awyers? R ethinking the N ature of Legal Services (2010); Richard
Susskind, T omorrow ’s Lawyers: A n Introduction to Your Future (2013) (hereinafter
Susskind, Tomorrow ’s Lawyers]; Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or
How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future o f the
Legal Services Industry, 62 Emory L.J. 909, 914-15 (2013). Others explore the current trends
in legal markets and provide guidance for how law schools should respond to these trends.
William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 461 (2013); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law's Information Revolution, 53 A riz . L. R ev. 1169 (2011);
see also William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L Rev . L. & Econ . 5
(2013) (exploring the changing trends in markets for legal services); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Death o f Big Law, 2010 Wise. L. Rev . 749 (predicting the demise of big law firms); Brian
Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption o f Legal Services, 2015 M ich.
St . L. Rev. 1797 (predicting the consequences of technological innovation on the legal
services industry).
12. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Dis
closure with Big Data, 112 M ich. L. R ev. 1417 (2014). Porat & Strahilevitz provide a theory
of personalized default rules in a world of big data. Wejump off from that point to explore the
wholesale effects of technological advances on law more generally. See Omri Ben-Shahar &
Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev . 627 (2016); George S. Geis,
An Experiment in the Optimal Precision o f Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. R ev . 1109
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev . 1 (2013).
13. The closest work to ours is that of John McGinnis and Steven Wasick. McGinnis &
Wasick, supra note 1. though they reach strikingly different conclusions, McGinnis and
Wasick begin in the same place as we do, asking how technological advances that reduce
information costs will affect the balance of rules and standards. Focusing primarily on legal
search technology and the ability to predict judicial outcomes, they predict a world where
standards and dynamic rules are favored over simple rules. Id. at 1049-50. Building on this
analysis, we add in the effects of communication technology and machine learning to show
that standards and rules (simple and dynamic) will no longer be viable forms of law.
14. Porat & Strahilevitz note that the dichotomy of personal and impersonal rules is not
the same as the dichotomy of rules and standards. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 145758. Personalized defaults can be rules or standards. And impersonal defaults also come in both
forms. Id. Beyond that observation, Porat and Strahilevitz focus their attention on the personalimpersonal dichotomy. Our analysis suggests, however, that all laws—both personal and
impersonal—will ultimately gravitate toward microdirectives that transcend the distinction
between rules and standards.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out our general theory of micro
directives and provides demonstrative examples. Part II explores the feasibility of
the technologies behind microdirectives. Part III discusses implications and broader
consequences of the rise of microdirectives and the death of rules and standards. A
final section concludes.
I. T he E m er g en c e of M ic r o d ir e c t iv e s a n d
th e D eclin e o f R ules a n d S ta n d a r d s

In this Part, we spell out how technology will affect the administration of law and
the structure of legal content. We outline two types of technology that will lead to a
dramatic reduction in the cost of calibrating and communicating ex ante legal direc
tives, thereby eliminating the need to choose between rules and standards. The analy
sis is presented in three sections. First, we briefly review the distinction between
rules and standards and outline the cost choices presented by the dichotomy. Second,
we set out our core theory that technology will fundamentally change those cost
choices. We provide two examples to demonstrate how predictive and communica
tion technologies will pave the way for microdirectives that capture the benefits of
both rules and standards. Third, we discuss how the emergence of microdirectives
can take place through different branches of lawmaking or can be driven by private
actors with access to predictive technology.
A. Background: Rules and Standards
Rules are precise and ex ante in nature. Rules indicate to an individual whether
certain behavior will violate or comply with the law. When a rule is enacted, effort
must be undertaken by lawmakers to give full and precise content to the law before
the individuals act. Standards, on the other hand, are imprecise when they are en
acted . 15 The exact content of the law comes after an individual acts, as judges and
other adjudicators determine whether the individual’s specific behavior in a particu
lar context violates the standard.
Generally, lawmakers incur both error costs and decision costs when enacting a
law. Error costs arise when a law is over- or underinclusive; the law allows behavior
that should be prohibited, or prohibits behavior that should be allowed . 16 Errors can
be reduced as lawmakers exert greater effort to get the law right. But this requires
information and deliberation. Reducing error costs imposes decision costs on the
lawmakers. Additionally, regulated individuals face a cost in figuring out whether
their behavior complies with the law. When the application of the law to a particular
situation cannot be easily predicted, the individual incurs cost of legal uncertainty.
Error, decision, and uncertainty costs arise in different ways for rules and stand
ards. The classic models in the rules-versus-standards literature conclude that, for

15. Standards are found wherever vague and ambiguous terms such as “reasonable,”
“material,” or “excessive” arc used in the law. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 308-09; Schauer,
supra note 2, at 804-05.
16. McGinnis & Wasick, supra note I, at 1031.
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several reasons, standards tend to perform better when the behavior of the regulated
actors is infrequent and heterogeneous.17
First, when behavior of regulated actors is infrequent, standards generate lower
decision costs because the content of the law only needs to be decided in the in
frequent event that the relevant context actually arises. Rules, on the other hand, re
quire ex ante decisions about all future possible scenarios. Where behavior is in
frequent and heterogeneous, lawmakers must make many more decisions if they want
to write rules that are as precise in application as a standard that is adjudicated ex
post would be. Rules do, however, impose lower decision costs when behavior is
frequent and homogeneous. Economies of scale kick in and a law need only be en
acted once rather than litigated over and over again.18
Second, error costs for standards are lower when behavior is infrequent and het
erogeneous because the adjudicator determining the content of the law ex post has
more information than the ex ante lawmaker. The adjudicator has additional context
not available to the ex ante lawmaker and has the benefit of hindsight in identifying
which factors are relevant.
On the other hand, adjudicator competency and bias complicate this simple model
of error costs.19 Ex post adjudication may suffer from hindsight bias20 and from bi
ases based on the personal characteristics of particular individuals.21 Such biases can
manifest themselves in arbitrariness, political favoritism, covert influence,
inconsistency, and discretionary justice22 even when judges believe they are being

17. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven M. Shavell, Economic Analysis o f Law, in 3
H andbook of P ublic Economics 1665, 1744^t5 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
2002 ).

18. Strict application of the doctrine of precedent also introduces economies of scale for
standards, but it does so in a way that turns the standard into a rule. See Holmes, supra note 7;
Anthony Niblelt, Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path o f the Law, 42 J. Legal Stud . 303,
310(2013).
19. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 2; Frederick Schauer, P laying by the Rules: A
Philosophical E xamination of Rule-B ased Decision-M aking in Law and in Life (1991);

see also Kaplow, supra note 1, at 609 (discussing institutional competence generally).
20. See generally Daniel Kahneman, T hinking, Fast and S low (2013); Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan .
L. R ev . 1471. 1523-27 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory o f
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. C hi. L. Rev . 571 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris
Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 N otre D ame L. Rev . 1195
(2009) (finding evidence of judicial bias based on race); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law o f Implicit Bias, 94 C al. L. R ev. 969 (2006) (discussing implicit biases
that individuals hold against disadvantaged groups).
22. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. Chi.
L. R ev. 831 (2008) (finding that political preference, race, gender, and other demographic
characteristics sometimes have effects on judicial judgments); Anthony Niblett, Tracking
Inconsistent Judicial Behavior, 34 Int’l R ev. L. & Econ. 9 (2013) (finding that judges in
California decide unconscionabilily cases inconsistently with precedent). See generally Jeffrey
A. Segal, Judicial Behavior, in T he O xford Handbook of Political Science 275 (Robert E.
Goodin ed., 2011). It has been argued that these flaws of judges may be partially responsible
for the increased (light to agency regulation over the past twenty to thirty years, in spite of the
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unbiased.2’
Ex ante lawmakers and regulators may, o f course, also be biased.2' But the biases
exhibited in ex post adjudication are particularly costly. Hindsight bias is more per
vasive and difficult to minimize for ex post adjudication. Additional biases based on
personal characteristics o f an individual are also more likely for ex post adjudication
and may be particularly pernicious and harmful to social objectives.25 The presence
o f biased adjudicators, thus, alters the error-cost trade-offs between rules and stand
ards and weakens any claims that standards have lower error costs.
A third cost comparison is also relevant when assessing the relative merits o f rules
and standards: the uncertainty cost imposed on the regulated actor in understanding
whether her behavior complies with the law. Uncertainty about the content o f a law
is greater with standards than with simple rules. When regulated by a simple rule, an
individual will more likely know whether her behavior is allowed or prohibited.2<>
When regulated by a standard, on the other hand, the individual does not know how
any particular judge with wide discretion will apply the standard to the facts. She
may not know what behavior a judge will consider reasonable.
The choice between using a rule or a standard to achieve a particular policy ob
jective is therefore a question o f weighing and trading off these costs. We predict
that advances in technology will fundamentally change that trade-off.

many well-rccognizcd and well-documented flaws of regulators and economic costs of
regulation. A ndrei Shleifer, T he Failure of J udges and the R ise of Regulators (2012);
see also Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, An Activity-Generating Theory o f
Regulation, 56 J.L. & Econ 1 (2013) (modeling the choice between ex ante regulation and ex
post judging where courts commit errors).
23. See generally Kahneman, supra note 20; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 97071; Rachlinski et al., supra note 21. at 1201-04 (exploring the effects of unconscious or
implicit biases).
24. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68
U. Cin. L. R ev. 1023, 1056-58 (2000) (noting the lack of attention to the behavioral biases of
regulators); Stephen .1. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan.
L. R ev. 1, 20-36 (2003) (cataloguing the biases affecting SEC regulators).
25. For our purposes, the important observation will be that machine-created rules are
less likely to be biased than humans in making rules or applying standards. Our analysis
suggests that given a legislative goal, machines will more faithfully implement that objective.
See infra Part II. It is possible, still, that judges are debiasing bad legislative policy (though
some empirical evidence suggests otherwise). In that case, judges have the power to override
and influence policy in a way that may be socially beneficial. That power will be lost as
standards die. We address these issues in Part III.
26. This assumes that judges (and juries) follow rules. They may, however, import
exceptions that turn rules into standards—or ignore the rules altogether. See Schaucr, supra
note 3, at 312-14. For the most part we bracket the possibility of such rule nullification. But
it is worth noting that the developments we explore make nullification less likely as well. See
infra Part UFA (discussing the diminished capacity for judges to influence and change legal
substance and policy). This is yet another way that law will become more rule based from the
perspective of the regulated individual.
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B. Technology Will Facilitate the Emergence o f
Microdirectives as a New Form o f Law
Two types of technology will lead to the death of rules and standards and the rise
of microdirectives: predictive technology and communication technology. The first
will facilitate lawmakers’ efforts to craft precise ex ante context-specific rules that
provide the nuance and specificity traditionally associated with standards. The
second will allow for the translation of those nuanced and specific laws into simple
directives that are communicated to the regulated actors in a timely manner.
Predictive Technology. Predictive technology, driven by ever increasing compu
tational capacity, will allow lawmakers to sculpt more perfect ex ante laws.27 Com
putation power is growing at exponential rates. The consistent trend o f the last fifty
years suggests that that power will, by the end of this century, be more than one
trillion times greater than what it is today.28 With even a fraction of that processing
power, tomorrow’s computers will be able to gather and analyze more facts than any
human lawmaker or judge. Lawmakers will be able to direct a machine to analyze a
massive amount of data instantly to predict which rules can precisely achieve a policy
objective.
Relying on the machines to observe and analyze more relevant facts, lawmakers
will make better predictions about the impact of a law and will face reduced error
costs. Lawmakers will no longer have to think up rules to enact laws. Judges will no
longer have to examine citizens’ decisions on a case-by-case basis in order to apply
laws. And the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of
judges introducing bias or incompetence. O f course, the calibration need not be per
fect, it only needs to be better than the calibration associated with the alternatives of
legislated rules and adjudicated standards.
As a practical matter, the result will be a new hybrid form of law that is both rule
and standard. The lawmaker can set a broad objective, which might look like a stand
ard. But the predictive technology will take the standard and engineer a vast catalog
of context-specific rules for every scenario. But that is only the first half of the
29
story."

27. In a different context, Professor Michael Abramowicz identified the power of
predictive decision making to "take[j advantage of the best of both the world of standards and
the world o f rules.” Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 V a . L. R ev . 69, 74
(2006). Our analysis is consistent with and builds on Abramowicz’s important insight. When
the power o f prediction that he identified is harnessed and amplified by technological advances
and coupled with new communication technologies, the law-making process fundamentally
changes.
28. See infra Part 11.A.2. This estimate is based on a trend known as Moore’s Law. See
generally Mark Lundstrom, Moore s Law Forever?, 299 Science 210, 210 (2003) (explaining
Moore’s Law and its implications for electronic systems); McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1,
at 1041 (describing Moore’s Law); Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto
Integrated Circuits, Electronics, April 19, 1965, at 114 (setting out the premise of Moore’s law).
29. The discussion of predictive technology here and throughout this Article assumes a
consequcntialist approach to law. For a consequentialist, the content of the law is driven by a
prediction of the outcome o f behavior. For nonconsequentialist theories, the use o f the
technology is slightly different. But the trend toward microdirectives will likely be the same.
For example, imagine that a lawmaker wants to prohibit certain behavior she deems immoral
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Communication Technology. In the second half, the com m unication technology
will sim plify that context-specific catalog o f rules into clear m icrodirectives for the
regulated individuals. W ithout that sim plification, the catalog o f rules w ould be too
com plex and pose significant com pliance challenges. It w ould be im possible for peo
ple to learn, rem em ber, and process all o f the requirem ents contained in the catalog.
But advances in com m unication technology will produce m icrodirectives that reduce
or elim inate those com pliance costs and prevent uncertainty costs that m ight other
w ise arise.
T he m echanism for translation is straightforw ard. Com m unication technology
will gather and transm it inform ation about the scenario in w hich the individual finds
herself,30 identify the applicable rule from the vast catalog, and then translate that
into a sim ple directive that is com m unicated back to the individual when she needs
it. In this way, m icrodirectives will turn hundreds or thousands o f context-specific,
m achine-generated rules into sim ple directives that are easy to understand and fol
low. T he law controlling a particular scenario may take into account hundreds or
thousands o f factors,31 but the individual will receive a sim ple com m and like a red
or green light. W hen the output from the predictive technology is translated into a
m icrodirective, citizens will be able to act as // they are taking into account more
relevant factors than are hum anly possible. ’2
*

*

*

To sum m arize, these technologies w ill com bine to do the follow ing. First, they

regardless of the consequences of that behavior. She does not want to list out all permutations
of immorality, so a rule will not work. Instead, she can start with a standard— immoral activity
is prohibited— and then identify samples o f immoral behavior to feed into a machine. The
machine can then use analytic and pattern recognition technology to determine whether other
new scenarios would be deemed immoral by the lawmaker. We discuss below a similar process
o f pattern recognition for the question of pornography that a lawmaker knows is pornography
when she sees it. See infra Part II.A.2.
30. We include this fact-gathering function in our analysis of communication technology
because the key innovation is the communication of the factual scenario from the specific
context to the analytic process. The technology facilitating this communication is likely to be
the same or related to the technology facilitating the communication (in the other direction) of
the final microdireetive from the process to the individual.
31. To the extent that certain factors like race and gender are considered out-of-bounds,
the machines can be programmed to ignore those factors. Indeed, it is easier for a machine to
affirmatively ignore a prohibited factor than for a human.
32. These microdirectives share some important characteristics with McGinnis and
Wasick’s “dynamic rules.” McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1039-45. Both can be very
precisely calibrated to specific conditions. But McGinnis and Wasick envision that at least the
algorithm is “fixed by a rule” that must be changed if the “world may change in a way that
makes another weighting o f factors achieve the legislature’s original objectives.” Id. at 1047—
48. We suggest instead that one o f the core functions of a microdirective is the ability to learn
from data and automatically update the weighting o f factors the way a judge would update her
application o f a standard. In this way, microdircctives arc not rules. They update automatically
and continuously to account for such changes in the weighting o f factors. But unlike standards
they can be communicated ex ante with certainty.
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will take a standard-like policy objective, analyze its application in all possible con
texts, and create a vast catalog of legal rules—each of which is tailored to best
achieve the objective in a specific scenario. Second, when a regulated actor is in any
actual scenario, the technologies will search the vast catalog and identify the specific
rules that are applicable. Third, they will translate those rules into a simple micro
directive on how the regulated actor can comply with the law. Fourth, they will com
municate that microdirective to the regulated actor in a timely and efficient manner.
C. Examples
To demonstrate the point, we present two stylized examples.
1. Example I: Predictive Technology in Medical Diagnosis
In this subsection, we provide an example that demonstrates how improved pre
dictive technology—technology that allows lawmakers to better predict the outcomes
of actions— will foster microdirectives.
Suppose you are a legislator. You are charged with determining when doctors
should be liable for performing a risky surgery on a patient. How can you best regu
late doctors’ behavior? How can you best draft a statute that will help doctors under
stand when their behavior complies with or violates the law? How many of the spe
cific details should you include in the statute? How many of these details can be
postponed until we have more information about how doctors behave in each case?
One option is to provide doctors with a clear and simple bright-line rule that dic
tates the circumstances under which surgery should or should not be conducted. This
simple rule provides great certainty to the doctors and is easily enforced; either a
doctor complied with the rule or she didn’t. A simple, precise ex ante rule would be
your preferred method if similar patients frequently present with the same symp
toms.’3 Under these circumstances, a rule would be preferred because the content of
the law can be established just once, and there are enormous benefits from economies
of scale.
But a doctor’s decision to operate on a patient frequently turns on many different
factors. A “one size fits all” rule here would likely not be optimal. Any simple brightline rule you enact will likely be overinclusive and underinclusive compared to an
optimal decision rule. There will be some patients who receive surgery who do not
need it (type I errors); there will also be other patients who do not receive surgery
who do need it (type II errors).
To overcome these errors, you may try to write a more complex rule. To formulate
this rule, you may try to think up many different scenarios, where you imagine dif
ferent types of patients presenting with various symptoms. A complex rule is pre
ferred if the cost of thinking and writing the rules is very low and the cost of doctors
understanding and being able to comply with such a complex rule is also low. But it
is often very costly for legislators to think up and write down all contingencies.

33. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 573-77 (discussing the importance of frequency in
assessing the desirability of rules).
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Further, the more complex the rule you write, the more difficult it becomes for a
doctor to follow .34
Rather than implement a rule, another option you have is to enact a standard and
evaluate the conduct of a doctor after the decision to operate (or not operate) has been
made. That is, the decision to hold a doctor liable would be made once all the
circumstances of the particular case are known . 35 For example, the legal standard
might stipulate that all doctors must take “reasonable care” in determining whether
to operate on patients. This provides doctors with greater flexibility to decide
whether or not the patient needs surgery . 36 But it also provides an ex post adjudicator
with the flexibility and discretion to determine what is meant by “reasonable.”
If a patient suffers harm as a result of a doctor’s decision, then a judge can look
at all the facts as they actually occurred and make an informed decision as to whether
the doctor took reasonable care. A standard would be better than a rule if patients
and symptoms are heterogeneous and the likelihood of two patients with the same
background and symptoms is very low.
There are, of course, costs associated with implementing and enforcing a standard.
First, the cost of deciding each case is not zero. There are decision costs of learning
the best course of action the doctor should have taken in the circumstances. Second,
a judge may apply the standard incorrectly, either due to error or to bias. Third—and
importantly— unlike a clear rule, a vague standard creates a great deal of uncertainty
for the doctor. A doctor may not know how a judge will decide any given case; fur
ther, different judges may decide inconsistently. If doctors are risk averse, a vague
law can chill socially desirable behavior, 37 and the uncertainty may generate consid
erable expense in the form of compliance costs.
But in our hypothetical situation, let’s suppose that a standard is optimal. Let’s
assume that the question of surgery rarely arises and that patients are highly diverse,
both in terms of health backgrounds and in terms of the symptoms they present. For
mulating detailed rules that cover all those situations and being able to communicate
these complex rules to doctors would be difficult, and a simple rule would create
high error costs. Case-by-case adjudication is not costless but it is preferred in our
example because the infrequent cost of determining the content of the law ex post is

34. Louis Kaplow, A Model o f the Optimal Complexity o f Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ . &
O rg. 150, 151 (1995) (modeling the trade-off between complexity and regulated actors’ ability
to comply); see also Diver, supra note 3, at 73-74 (noting the trade-off between precision and
ease of applying and following a law).
35. As Henry Hart and Albert Sacks note: “The wise draftsman . . . asks himself, how
many of the details o f this settlement ought to be postponed to another day, when the decisions
can be more wisely and efficiently and perhaps more readily made?” Henry M. Hart, J r . &
A lbert M. Sacks, T he L egal P rocess: B asic Problems in the Making and A pplication
of Law 157(1958).
36. See John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics o f Legalism: Rules Versus
Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 Soc. & L egal Stud . 307 (1995). After comparing
nursing homes in rule-based United States and standard-based Australia, Braithwaite &
Braithwaite conclude that the flexibility of standards in Australia allows health care
professionals to respond to their patients’ needs better than professionals merely applying strict
rules. Id.
37. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 6, at 298-99 (concluding that uncertainty can
reduce socially desirable behavior).
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lower than the costs of trying to specify the law up front in all potential situations,
many of which will never arise.
Now let’s examine how technology will eliminate this trade-off between rules and
standards. Suppose that you learn of the existence of a diagnostic machine that is
designed to predict when surgery is required. The machine takes into account rele
vant facts about the patient38 -h e r history, the symptoms, and other relevant infor
mation—to provide a best guess as to whether the patient requires surgery.
You, the legislator, have access to this machine. How does this predictive machine
affect your decision to enact a rule or a standard? The answer turns on two factors.
First, how good is the machine at accurately predicting outcomes? If the predictive
technology is very powerful and the machine is able to provide precise and accurate
information, then this points in favor of using the machine to create a rule, rather
than relying on a judge to adjudicate a standard. Second, can this information be
easily communicated to a doctor? That is, can lawmakers provide the doctor with
timely notice of what behavior will comply with or violate the law?
Consider two scenarios:
Scenario 1: A terrible predictor
In scenario I, the machine is very poor at predicting when a patient re
quires surgery. The machine essentially randomizes patients for surgery.
The machine generates both type I and type II errors. One might think of
the technology as a simple coin toss: heads for surgery, tails for no
surgery.
Scenario 2: A perfect predictor
In scenario 2, the machine can predict with 100% accuracy whether a
patient requires surgery or not. The machine instantly examines the pa
tient’s history and symptoms, analyzes millions o f prior cases, and reads
all articles in medical journals. It then makes a perfect prediction. It is
better than any human at determining whether it is optimal to have sur
gery. There are no type I errors: patients who do not need surgery are not
designated for surgery. There are no type II errors: patients who need
surgery are designated for surgery.
Under scenario I, the technology should have no effect on your decision as a
regulator to implement a rule or a standard. You should implement a standard and
determine liability on a case-by-case basis, learning more about doctors’ behavior
over time.
Under scenario 2, however, the optimal form of the law will be different. The
machine’s predictions provide the exact content of the law. The machine provides
microdirectives for each and every scenario. The over- and underinclusivity associ
ated with simple rules have disappeared. There are no errors (type I or type II) in this
scenario. And the costs incurred in thinking up and formulating such a complex rule
have already been incurred in the development of this machine.39 The justification

38. In practice, the machine would actually take into account relevant information about
the doctor as well, such as his track record with surgeries of the relevant type.
39. In reality many of the costs for developing the machine may have been incurred by
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for relying on ex post adjudication o f standards— reducing the error costs o f rules
— is gone. Further, we have an added benefit o f elim inating uncertainty for the doc
tors. I f they follow the directive o f the m achine, they know they will not be held
liable.
T he em ergence o f m icrodirectives and the death o f rules and standards as we
know them do not rely on p erfect predictive technology. Rather, as the predictive
technology gets better and better, we m ove aw ay from the w orld o f scenario I and
tow ards the world o f scenario 2. T here will com e a point w here the technology is
g o o d enough that the costs o f using a m icrodirective are sufficiently low so that there
is no longer any need to use traditional rules or standards.
A caveat is necessary. T his tipping point can only be realized if the rules generated
by the m achine can be easily com m unicated to doctors. T hat is, the legislator has to
be able to provide the doctor with a quick and sim ple answ er to the question o f
w hether the patient requires surgery.
D octors would find it difficult to follow com plex, com puter-derived rules. R egu
lated actors have neither the desire nor the tim e to thum b through thousands o f pages
o f legislation and understand com plex algorithm s. Rather, law m akers need som e
form o f technology to allow a doctor to easily input all the relevant facts about a
patient and receive an instant output that dictates w hether or not the patient requires
surgery. O ne m ight im agine a w eb-based program or m obile app, w here the doctor
can quickly and easily enter all relevant facts, subm it the inform ation, and instantly
receive a binding ex ante opinion. Such technology is em erging and will be able to
transform the com plex rules generated by m achine prediction into a sim ple directive
that the doctor can follow .40 The costs to the doctor in understanding the com plex
rule will be dram atically reduced as this technology im proves. Even though the rule
will be highly com plex and based on a sophisticated algorithm , from the perspective

industry for the nonlegal benefits that the machine brings. In that sense, the marginal costs of
using it for law are negligible. Moreover, even if the machine had to be developed specifically
for law, that is a fixed cost that can be averaged across all applications when calculating the
per rule cost.
40. See, e.g., Robert McMillan & Elizabeth Dwoskin. IBM Crafts a Rote fo r Artificial
Intelligence in Medicine, Wa ll St . J. (Aug. 11, 2015,12:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/ibm-crafts-a-role-for-artificial-intelligence-in-medicine-1439265840 [https://pcrma.cc/DXL7
-TUWG] (describing IBM’s planned move into artificially intelligent diagnostics for cancer
and other diseases); Joseph Walker, Can a Smartphone Tell i f You ’re Depressed?, Wall St . J.
(Jan. 5, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-smartphone-tell-if-youre-deprcsscd
-1420499238 [https://perma.cc/6AWE-C4AUI (describing tests o f a new generation of
“health-surveillance technologies” that can gather information to diagnose illness and assess
physical and mental well-being); Ron Winslow, Patients Seeking Alternatives to Statins May
Undergo Rigorous Vetting, W a ll St . J. (July 27, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/patients-seeking-altemativcs-to-statins-may-undergo-rigorous-vetting-1438029636 |https://
perma.cc/79SD-9EDM] (describing a software application that guides doctors through the
decision to put patients on nonstatin cholesterol treatment). See generally William M. Grove
& Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency o f Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and
Format (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Contro
versy, 2 Psych., Pur. Pol ’y & Law 293 (1996) (noting how simple formal algorithms fre
quently outperform human predictions).
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of the doctor, the rule will be simple: operate or do not operate.41 We explore com
munication technology further in our second example.
2. Example 2: Communication Technology in Traffic Laws
In this subsection, we highlight the way improved communication technology will
facilitate microdirectives. Machines can almost instantaneously gather information,
process it, and produce a useable output that directs how individuals should behave.
Traffic lights provide an example of this type of technology. They communicate
the content of a law to drivers at little cost and with great effect. This notice technol
ogy— combined with technology for predicting traffic patterns and driver behavior
—creates an environment where lawmakers are able to replace vague standards and
simplistic rules with crisp and increasingly complex microdirectives.
Electric traffic lights communicate to drivers precisely when they are required to
stop and when they may proceed. Traffic lights appear to generate very simple rules:
if the light is red, you must stop; if the light is green, you may go. But these rules are
simple only from the perspective of the driver. From the perspective of the lawmak
ers, the underlying rules are complex. The simplest underlying rule may dictate that
cars must stop during regular, alternating time intervals. In more complex examples,
the time intervals can vary by intersection, direction of traffic, or time of day.
If promulgated without traffic lights, these rules would be far too complex. Driv
ers would have to consult tables that matched intersections, times, and directions
with prescribed intervals of stopping. They would also have to consult precise clocks
to determine when the intervals start and end.
The traffic light translates complexities into a simple command. From the driver’s
point of view, the lights provide a directive that is easily understood. And the law
maker’s cost of giving notice is low.42 Electric traffic lights take advantage of signif
icant economies of scale that enable lawmakers to make complex rules, translate
them into simple directives, and deliver notice of the required behavior to many
drivers.
Moreover, while the command of the traffic light remains simple, the substance
of the underlying rules is becoming more complex. Predictive analysis facilitates this
process. Stopping at a red light when an intersection is deserted is wasteful and

41. It may seem odd at first that lawmakers are in the business of diagnostic technology.
But this is no different from what judges do in medical litigation. Judges hear expert testimony
and decide ex post whether certain behavior was reasonable. In our example, lawmakers just
use expert technology to do that ex ante. It is true that the role of the doctor has changed
— diagnostic judgment is less important— but that is the inevitable result o f advances in
diagnostic technology. Our point is simply that in the hands of lawmakers the technology also
changes the role of law. When the technology is only available to the private actors— the
doctors in this example— then the evolution of rules into standards takes a slightly different
path. We discuss this infra Part I.D.
42. These stop-go rules would be far more costly if humans operated traffic lights.
Indeed, the first gas-powered traffic light used in 1868 in London, United Kingdom, was
operated by humans. The Man Who Gave Us Traffic Lights, BBC: N ottingham (last updated
July 22, 2009, 11:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/nottingham/content/articles/2009/07/16
/john peake knight traffic lighls feature.shtml | https://perma.cc/4M28-DWR7].
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costly.43 T hat rule is overinclusive. It w ould be better if the directive to the driver
could change depending on the circum stances (as it w ould w ith a standard). To ad
dress this, traffic lights in som e jurisdictions already contain sensors that detect and
predictively analyze traffic flow and adjust the tim ing o f red and green lights accord
ingly.44 Som e traffic lights contain detectors allow ing em ergency service vehicles to
“preem pt” the signal and expedite their journey.45 In the near future, these system s
will take into account m ore variables, such as the num ber o f cars, speed o f travel, or
type o f intersection. T hey m ight even take into account personal characteristics o f a
vehicle’s driver or passengers.46 In the not-so-distant future, a traffic-light system
m ay know that a passenger in a regular vehicle requires m edical attention and give
the rushing driver a series o f green lights all the w ay to the hospital.
T he progress o f traffic lights show s how law m akers can define optim al policy
outcom es (for exam ple, travel tim es and accident rates) and m achines can generate a
catalog o f rules and exceptions to achieve those outcom es. A nd yet— even w hile the
law m akers enact a standard and the m achines generate an increasingly com plex cata
log o f rules underpinning the operation o f traffic lights— from the perspective o f the
driver, the law will rem ain constant and straightforw ard: a sim ple stop-go directive.
T his phenom enon is not lim ited to traffic law. The forces at w ork here are ubiq
uitous. T he invention and m ass adoption o f Internet technology has facilitated in
stantaneous and cheap com m unication betw een individuals across all dom ains.47 It
also, im portantly, allow s for im m ediate com m unication betw een law m akers and
individuals.
D. The D ifferent C hannels Leading to the D eath o f R ules a n d Standards
W e have, until now, spoken generally o f law m aking by a legislature. T hat is by
no m eans the only avenue. M icrodirectives can em erge through tw o other channels:
(1) nonlegislative (regulatory or judicial) law m aking; and (2) private use o f technol
ogy by regulated actors.48 We discuss each in turn.

43. There are other potential costs such as the increase in the number o f rear end traffic
accidents caused by cars braking as lights turn yellow. We argue that these costs will also die
out as the rule becomes more context specific.
44. See, e.g., Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light,
N.Y. T imes (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.eom/20l3/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los
-angeles-synchronizes-every-red-light.html [https://perma.cc/SS66-29A7l (describing Los
Angeles’s $400 million system of synchronized traffic sensors aimed at controlling traffic flow
and reducing gridlock); see also Diane Cardwell, Copenhagen Lighting the Way to Greener,
More Efficient Cities, N.Y. T imes (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/20l4/12/09
/business/energy-environmenl/co penhagen-lighting-the-way-lo-greener-more-efficient-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/3L2D-YS68l (noting Copenhagen’s use of lights and sensors aimed at easing
mobility and cutting use o f fuel as well as achieving more ambitious goals).
45. U.S. D ep ’t T ransp., T raffic S ignal Preemption for Emergency Vehicles a
C ross-C utting Study 1-1 (2006), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/jpodocs/repts_te/14097_files/14097.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SDF-BRC8l (noting the signal preemption programs in various
jurisdictions).
46. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (noting the value of personalized laws).
47. See infra Part II.
48. Here, we discuss different channels through which technology will affect the law. In
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1. The Production of Microdirectives by Nonlegislative Lawmakers
Legislatures are not the only lawmakers with access to technology. In many cases,
the lawmaking power is entrusted to a regulator or enforcement agent.49 In other
cases, judges make law. Those entities can also use technology to create and com
municate microdirectives to regulated actors.
Regulatory microdirectives. It is likely to be more politically feasible for regula
tors to develop microdirectives than legislators. The legislative path to enacting a
computer algorithm is complicated. Pork barrel and horse-trading amendments to an
algorithm do not make for successful programming. On the other hand, a regulator
tasked with enforcing some legislated standard might easily adopt an algorithmdriven system of microdirectives.50
The pressures on a budget-constrained regulatory body will push the agency to
ward adopting technology. Likewise, trends towards cost-benefit analysis and re
quirements that regulations be shown to be cost justified51 are likely to accelerate
agency adoption. Predictive technology facilitates such cost-benefit analysis, reduces
uncertainty costs to the regulated actors, and cuts down on ex post adjudication costs.
Congress could enact a standard and direct that these standards be administered
by an algorithm-based system of microdirectives overseen by regulators or the regu
lators could themselves decide to implement the standard in that manner.52
Advance tax rulings provide an example of an area for regulators to use microdirectives.5’ As it currently stands, taxpayers may seek clarification of vague stand
ards in the law by asking the tax authority to examine their tax arrangements and
determine whether they comply with the code.54 A taxpayer may ask the tax authority
to give a ruling on a matter that takes into account a number of factors such as: Am
I a resident of the United States for tax purposes? Or, are my workers independent
contractors or are they employees?55

other work, we have discussed the incremental nature of these changes. See Anthony J. Casey
& Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016).
49. From the legislature’s perspective, the delegation to an agency or enforcer takes the
form of a standard. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 310. The legislature sets a broad goal and
gives the agency the power to fill the content of rules.
50. McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1042 (discussing the use of algorithms by rule
makers); cf. id. at 310-12.
51. See generally C ass R. S unstein, T he C ost-B enefit State: T he Future of
Regulatory Protection (2002) (exploring the rise of cost-benefit analysis in administrative
agencies).

52. This is not the same as traditional convergence predictions where rules become
standards or standards become rules. Schauer, supra note 3, at 310-12. With microdirectives,
laws take a new form that has some of the benefits of rules (more certainty) and some of the
benefits of standards (better calibration) but fewer of the costs associated with either.
53. See generally C arlo Romano, A dvance T ax Ruling and Principles of Law
(2002); Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise o f Advance
Tax Rulings, 29 Va. T ax . Rev . 137,144-47 (2009) (describing how advance tax rulings reduce
uncertainty).
54. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (2017); Givati, supra note 53, at 149-52 (outlining the process
and implications of obtaining an advance tax ruling).
55. Romano, supra note 53, at 80.
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These advance tax rulings bind the tax authority to the tax arrangements set out
in the ruling, but only for the one specific taxpayer.56 Essentially the taxpayer is ask
ing the tax authority to turn an ex post standard into a specific rule that applies solely
to her circumstances. These advance rulings have a variety o f benefits. Most promi
nently, they provide greater legal certainty to the taxpayer.57 They eliminate the un
certainty costs o f the standard.58 But such rulings can be costly to generate.54 The tax
authority is essentially engaged in personalized rule making. It is incurring high ex
ante decision costs by enacting a rule that applies to just one taxpayer.60
Now imagine the tax authority could create a system where a taxpayer simply
turns to a machine to answer her tax questions. She could, for example, turn to an
agency website or a mobile app. She could ask the machine whether her tax arrange
ments will expose her to liability and the machine could quickly read the entire tax
code, all relevant cases, all associated regulations, and all relevant advisory opinions.
The machine could immediately provide an answer to the taxpayer’s question.61
The tax authority, thus, could use this artificially intelligent machine to provide
advance tax rulings. Depending on the underlying objective o f the legislature, the tax
authority could use the machine to identify optimal rules that allow it to generate
more revenue with greater efficiency and fewer distortions on market behavior. It
could use this technology very broadly to choose very specific rules that are highly
calibrated to legislative objectives without introducing compliance costs that would
otherwise be associated with such complexity.
If regulators adopt these technologies, the answers provided by the tax authority
would essentially become the red or green lights o f tax law. Even though the under
lying tax laws would be very complex, the directives provided to an individual would
be simple. Any enforcement agent could adopt technology o f this kind.62 As

56. In the United States, these rulings (“private letter rulings”) are “binding on the IRS if
the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries
out the transaction as described.” Understanding IRS Guidance A Brief Primer, IRS (last
updated July 6, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uae/Understanding-lRS-Guidanee-A-Brief-Primer
[https://perma.cc/RGV3-APFP]; see also 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (a)( 1)—(2), (I); Givati, supra note
53, at 149-50.
57. Rom ano , supra note 53, at 77-78.
58. Givati, supra note 53, at 147.
59. Rom ano , supra note 53, at 277-80.
60. See Givati, supra note 53, at 149. As a formal matter, the rulings only resolve the
relationship between the tax authority and one specific taxpayer. Further, they have no formal
precedential effect for future taxpayers. As a practical matter, however, the tax authority is
required to treat taxpayers consistently and so a de facto precedential value arises—but this
does not rise to the level of a binding rule for all future cases. Id. at 158-61 (discussing the
nuances of the precedential value of advance rulings and surveying the legal scholarship on
the matter).
61. For more on this process, see Benjamin Alarie, The Path o f the Imw: Towards Legal
Singularity, 66 U. T oronto L.J. 443 (2016); Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblelt & Albert 11. Yoon,
Using Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Im w , 58 C anadian Bus. L.J. 231 (2016).
62. The Securities and Exchange Commission has a program similar to advance tax
rulings where it provides “no-action” letters that state that the staff will not recommend
enforcement actions against the individual or entity seeking guidance. The letter has no
binding effect on other individuals or entities, and the SEC reserves the right to change its
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predictive technology makes it easier to automate such regulatory advance rulings
and ensure their accuracy, they will become a common mechanism for the adoption
of machine-generated microdirectives.63
Judicial microdirectives. Aside from the legislator and the regulator, there is, of
course, athird potential rule maker: the judge. But, as they currently function, judges
do not quite fit into this model of law making. To be sure, judges could use artificial
intelligence and big data to apply standards or complex rules.64 But judges are not—
at least in a formal sense— regularly in the business of providing ex ante notice of
the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios.
For better or worse, advisory opinions are frowned upon by the American judicial
system. Judges might use the predictive technology to refine the law ex post. But
without notice to the regulated actors, those specific rulings impose some of the same
costs as standards. For example, if judges announce that all negligence cases will be
decided using a computer algorithm,65 a regulated actor without access to the algo
rithm would still be faced with nothing more than a standard that imposes uncertainty

position. See No Action Letters, U.S. Sec. & Exchange C ommission, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/noaction.htm [https://perma.cc/HP8Q-WCWB] (last updated Sept. 21, 2012). See
generally Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and Proposed Framework, 83 C ornell L. R ev. 921 (1998)
(describing the no-action letter process).
63. There will be some areas in law where the provision of advance directives is
problematic. Tax provides a salient example. For some things, the lawmaker and the individual
have aligned incentives. The individual wants to comply with the lawmaker’s policy objectives
and certainty makes compliance more likely. But for other things, the individual wants formal
compliance with law but would prefer to avoid the policy objective. In other words, the
individual is looking for a loophole. If the law provides a clear rule and the regulated individual
would prefer to circumvent that rule, then certainty provides a road map for avoidance. See
David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. C hi. L. R ev . 860, 882 84 (1999)
(describing the use o f “anti-abuse” standards to deal with rule avoidance).
In these spaces, it is difficult to predict how microdirectives will fair. On the one hand, the
use o f microdirective technology to craft a precise law may shrink the space for avoidance.
After all, a perfectly calibrated law will provide no space for avoidance. On the other hand, if
the law has any imperfection and the regulated individual has superior private technology, she
may use the technology to find the imperfections and craft her behavior (such as creating
elaborate tax avoidance mechanisms) to avoid application of the microdirective. These arms
race scenarios—where avoidance creates private benefits and private technology is in
competition with the lawmakers’ technology— suggest areas where standards, such as the anti
abuse standard, will survive to supplement microdirectives. Still, the problem could be solved
without standards. Revelation o f the microdirective could simply be delayed until immediately
after the regulated individual took action. This prevents evasion but also commits the
government to the rule ahead o f time to avoid bias. On the general idea o f delaying the
revelation of rules to prevent evasion, see Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other
Comments on Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. C hi. L. R ev. 915 (1999).
64. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (“Under certain circumstances, we
want the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science o f Big Data as a
means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous contract or will.”).
65. The hypothetical scenario is not as fanciful as it may sound. The algorithm here is
just a more precise amalgamation o f the expert opinions that courts routinely rely on in
deciding cases.

2017]

THE DEATH OF RULES AND STANDARDS

1421

about how the ju d g e s will apply that standard. It w ould m ake little difference to the
individual that the actual ju d g e happens to be a com puter.66
Things change if the regulated actors have access to the algorithm that ju d g es will
use. In that w orld, the regulated actors can predict the outcom e w ith precision. If
ju d g es com m it to using a certain technology that is available to the public, that would
be equivalent to providing advance rulings.67 This w ould essentially shift the ju d g e ’s
role to that o f ex ante regulators. W hile not im plausible, w e think the avenues o f
legislative and regulatory rulem aking will be m ore pervasive.
T here is another w ay that ju d g es could be involved in the prom ulgation o f m icro
directives. Just as legislatures could set a broad policy objective and delegate the rule
m aking to an agency, so too could the courts. In deciding cases, courts can announce
a standard that blesses any rule that results from a process aim ed at the correct policy
objective and that takes into account the relevant factors. T he agency could then cre
ate an algorithm that does exactly that. T his “ second-order regulation” by the court
w ould send a m essage to the agencies on how to design the algorithm to ensure
com pliance.68 H ere again it w ould be the agencies and enforcers who have the
ultim ate responsibility for im plem enting the m achine algorithm to prom ulgate
m icrodirectives.
2. An A lternative path: Private Use o f T echnology by Regulated A ctors
Predictive technology will be available to private actors. And, in som e cases, pri
vate actors m ay have m ore advanced proprietary technology than legislatures, regu
lators, or courts.69 Private use o f predictive technology will lead to the em ergence o f
m icrodirectives. T here are tw o main w ays this can occur.
T he first path is through the interplay o f reasonableness, industry standards, and
technology. In our m edical exam ple above, im agine that the m achine that predicts
m edical outcom es is available not to law m akers but only directly to doctors. As the

66. It is worth noting that ex post error and inconsistency costs are likely to be lower if
the judge is using the algorithm. See the example of bail, infra Part II.A.2.
67. In a slightly different but related context, one commentator has suggested that judges
could bind themselves to textualist interpretations o f statutes by using computers to derive the
meaning oftext. Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could IB M ’s Watson Beat Courts at Their
Own Game?, 121 Y ale L.J. F orum 87 (2011), http://yalelawjoumal.org/forum/judges-in
-jeopardy-could-ibms-watson-beat-courts-at-their-own-game | https://perma.ee/8DDC-ZC9L].
68. See John Rappaporl, Second-Order Regulation o f Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L.
R ev. 205, 214 (2015) (defining a second-order judicial decision as one that “states its
obligations in terms of ultimate goals that must be achieved. The [agent] is then free to achieve
those goals in any appropriate way” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform
105 (1982))). 'This can be done for all standards including those that the court applies pursuant
to the Constitution. See infra Part III. Rappaport’s example of the court's second-order
regulation of Fourth Amendment searches, Rappaporl, supra, at 220-22, is an area where the
death o f rules and standards will be swift. Machine algorithms will be able to easily determine
probable cause, exigent circumstances, bias o f officers, and the like better than humans.
69. For example, private traders of securities have technology that permits higher
frequency trading than regulators can observe and monitor in real time. See Eric Budish, Peter
Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as
a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. Econ . 1547 (2015).
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technology becomes more accurate we can expect more and more doctors to use it.
At some point, it is likely that courts will begin to deem it per se unreasonable to not
use such advanced technology. Imagine an orthopedic practice today that did not use
an x-ray machine70 or a colorectal specialist who refused to perform colonoscopies
in diagnosing colon cancer.71 As technology becomes more accurate and widespread,
the likelihood that courts will base a reasonableness standard on the use of that tech
nology increases. The proliferation of these technologies across industries will cause
behavior that complies with standards to function exactly as if it were complying
with a microdirective promulgated by the predictive technology.
The second path is a softer version of our main thesis. This path does not require
lawmakers to use technology. Individuals can use predictive technology to provide
predictions on how judges will apply a standard.72 In this way, technology improves
on the role of lawyers as compliance advisors.7’ When lawyers provide compliance
advice, they are, in part, predicting how ex post adjudicators will apply a standard.74
As computers can gather and analyze more and more prior cases, they will
outperform lawyers at this task. On first blush, this advance would appear to reduce
the compliance cost o f standards. But it does so in a way that effectively turns the
standard into a microdirective, as it reduces the costs of legal uncertainty because it
tells the individual exactly how to behave. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, a pre
diction of a judicial outcome is the law.75
Advances in big data and artificial intelligence will spawn intelligent machines
that can predict legal outcomes with great accuracy.70 In our traffic example, imagine

70. Doctors have frequently been held negligent for failing to order x-rays. See, e.g.,
Rudick v. Prineville Mem’I IIosp., 319 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963) (x-rays would have revealed
fractured vertebrae); Webb v. Lungstrum, 575 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1978) (x-rays would have
revealed small metal fragment in wound); Bctenbaugh v. Princeton Hosp., 235 A.2d 889 (NJ.
1967) (negligence found where doctor failed to order x-ray of the injured part of the spine).
71. Doctors who failed to order a colonoscopy have been held negligent. See, e.g., Morse
v. Davis, 965 N.E.2d 148 (lnd. Ct. App. 2012).
72. McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1033-39 (discussing the use of technology to
predict judicial outcomes).
73. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out o f Work Prod
uct, 79 Fordham L. Rev . 1869, 1874-81 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult to distinguish be
tween business and law in corporate practice); Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via
Business Deregulation: Compliance Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 Int’l J.
Legal Prof. 175 (1999) (exploring the role of lawyers as compliance officers); Gregory J.
Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career?, Wall St . J. (Jan. 15,
2014, 8:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000l424052702303330204579250722114
538750 |https://perma.cc/E5AW-2Z54| (examining the rise of compliance officers).
74. On the law-and-economics of ex ante legal advice, see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision o f Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L., Econ. &
O rg. 306 (1992). See also Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Wcyrauch, A Theory o f Legal Strat
egy, 49 Duke L.J. 1405 (2000) (discussing the law-and-economics literature of legal culture
and legal strategy).
75. Holmes, supra note 7, at 461 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.. .
are what I mean by the law.”); see also Abramowicz, supra note 27.
76. See Katz, supra note 11 (exploring the power of big data to predict legal outcomes);
see also Poral & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (same).
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that traffic is regulated only with yield signs that impose a reasonableness standard.77
But in this world, consumer technology has advanced to a stage where it can predict
when a court will deem yielding to be required under the standard. This private tech
nology provides a mechanism for informing the driver when she must stop under the
law. The technology gathers the relevant facts, applies the standard to those facts as
ajudge would, and provides predictive analysis.
Even though we have standards and private technology, the resulting behavior
looks as if we had public traffic lights with underlying complex rules. And compli
ance is as simple for the driver as it would be with a microdirective. The driver simply
gets a message saying stop. She does not have to even take mental note o f the under
lying facts. As technology makes ex post adjudication more predictable, citizens treat
a prediction as a rule. They receive directives ex ante and have little uncertainty about
how the law requires them to behave.
This may lead lawmakers to simply enact those predictions as law. It is possible,
though, that lawmakers may deem fully predictable ex post adjudication to be the
satisfactory equivalent o f a microdirectives and not take the final step to formalize
the microdirectives into law. But from the individual’s perspective the transfor
mation will be already complete. Drivers will know to stop when the technology in
their car gives a signal— the equivalent o f a red light.78

II. Feasibility
In this Part, we examine the feasibility o f using technology to generate micro
directives. This Part is divided in two main sections. First, we examine the feasibility
o f predictive technology. We look at examples where big data and artificial intelli
gence have been used to generate better predictions and insights than humans ever
could provide, and we look to where the technology is headed. We look at how such
predictive technology has dramatically diminished the need for human discretion.
Second, we examine the feasibility o f communication technology. For the most
part, this technology is already here and steadily improving. Mobile devices are be
coming our first port o f call for information. Individuals can easily and quickly com
municate with other individuals, and— more importantly for our argument— law
makers can easily and quickly communicate with regulated actors.

A. The Feasibility o f Predictive Technology
There are two key takeaways from this section: (1) machines are, in many areas,

77. See, e.g., 625 III. C omp. Stat. 5/11-904(c) (West 2016) (requiring that a driver at a
yield sign slow to “a speed reasonable for the existing conditions” and stop "if required for
safety”); M ass. G en . Laws 89 § 9 (LexisNexis 2012) (same); Pierce v. Coltraro, 252 So.2d
550, 552-53 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (noting the standard that applies at a yield sign).
78. It is possible that judges, knowing about the predictive technology, will (consciously
or unconsciously) respond by changing their behavior. If that were true, and assuming that
advanced algorithms could not account for the changes when making predictions, that would
suggest that technology for predicting judicial outcomes would lag behind other predictive
technology in effectiveness. This alternative path toward the death of standards would,
therefore, be less likely than the paths through legislative and regulatory rule making.
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already better at predicting outcomes and behavior than any human; and (2) this tech
nology is improving so rapidly that the superiority o f machines in predicting out
comes will continue to grow at an exponential rate.
Machines can process billions of data points instantly to determine an optimal
course of action. Even the most competent, objective humans cannot compete with
algorithms generated by big data and artificial intelligence. We are producing and
analyzing ever-increasing stores of data that will provide the backbone of predictive
technology. It may be difficult to envision these longer-term trends, but as Bill Gates
has noted: “We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years
and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten.”79 One can only imagine
the extent to which we underestimate the change that will occur in the next twenty
years, or by the end of this century.
In this section, we first explore how technological developments will improve the
prediction of human behavior by better understanding and analyzing millions of hy
pothetical situations. We foreshadow the future growth of cognitive computing, arti
ficial intelligence, and evolutionary algorithms to show how these powerful new
technologies will facilitate the emergence of microdirectives. We then look at how
human discretion is being replaced by computer-based rules in all professions and
argue that law is no different.
I. The Power of Predictive Technology
Big data and artificial intelligence have reached a stage where likely outcomes
can already be predicted in many aspects of human life.80 By the end of the last cen
tury, computing machines were able to defeat the best grandmasters in chess.81 A
decade later, an artificially intelligent machine destroyed the grandmasters of the
television trivia show Jeopardy!*2 Indeed, machines outperform humans in many
areas of life.81 They can predict consumers’ taste84 and advise clients on financial

79.
80.
81.

B ill G ates, T he Road A head 316(1996).
See generally Katz, supra note 11.
In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated Garry Kasparov 3 ‘A games to IVi. For
commentary on and descriptions of the match, see Bruce Pandolfini, Kasparov and Deep
Blue : T he H istoric C hess M atch Between M an and Machine (1997).
82. John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy! Trivial, I t’s Not, N.Y. T imes (Feb. 16,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html [https://perma
,cc/CM9S-7CQ4|.
83. See Martin Ford, T he R ise of the Robots: T echnology and the T hreat of a
Jobless Future (2015).
84. See generally T homas W. M iller, Modeling T echniques in Predictive
A nalytics: Business Problems and Solutions (2014). As an example, artificially
intelligent machines can predict wine prices better than wine connoisseurs. See Quants and
Quaffs, T he Economist (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/science-andtechnology/21660405-artificial-intelligence-may-beat-connoisseurship-quants-and-quaffs
| https://perma.cc/7PCL-X6U9l. Companies such as Amazon. Netflix, and Match.com have all
used machine learning algorithms to better understand consumers’ tastes. Pedro Domingos,
Why Businesses Embrace Machine Learning [Excerpt], Sci. A m. (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://www.scicntificamerican.com/article/why-businesses-embrace-machine-leaming-excerpt/
[https://perma.ee/U5Y8-FNQG].
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opportunities.85 In the field o f m edicine, com puters can analyze im ages and predict
the likelihood o f cancer.86
But tod ay ’s use o f big data and algorithm s to predict outcom es is ju st the begin
ning. T he capacity o f com puters to process inform ation and collect and store data
continues to explode.87 The D irector o f Engineering at G oogle, Ray K urzw eil, re
cently noted: “T h ere’s a very sm ooth exponential increase in the price-perform ance
o f com puting going back to the 1890 census.”88 As econom ist P rofessor W illiam
N ordhaus notes, the increase in com puter pow er over the course o f the tw entieth
century w as “phenom enal,” 89 im proving m anual com puting pow er by a factor o f
betw een 1.7 trillion and 76 trillion tim es with an explosive trend beginning only after
the Second W orld W ar.90
T he grow th in com putational pow er has closely tracked “ M oore’s L aw ” over the
past fifty years.91 M oore’s Law is the observation that the num ber o f transistors in a
dense integrated circuit doubles approxim ately every tw o years.92 T his observation
has proved rem arkably accurate and is now used as a guide to understanding w here
com puting will be in the future.93 If the trend continues, then w ithin tw enty years,
com puting pow er will be 1000 tim es w hat it is to d a y .M
T hat trend will allow com puting technology to expand its influence. In the sam e
way that city planners have already developed com puters that track aggregate traffic
flow s,95 governm ents will likely be able to collect and use data on how hum ans

85. Brad Power, Artificial Intelligence Is Almost Ready fo r Business, Harv. Bus. Rev .
(Mar. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/artificial-intelligence-is-almost-ready-for-business
[https://perma.cc/ZA2K-57R31.
86. IBM’s Watson, the same artificially intelligent process that defeated the grandmasters
of Jeopardy!, has been used in the medical context. Carl Zimmer, Enlisting a Computer To
Battle Cancers, One by One, N.Y. T imes (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03
/27/science/enlisting-a-computer-to-battle-cancers-one-by-one.html [https://perma.cc/89VR
-LSYN],
87. See Martin Hilbert & Priscila Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity To Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 Science 60 (2011) (estimating the growth of
computing power and capacity); see also Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 | https://perma.cc/ZJZ2-8MHN].
88. Ray Kurzweil on the Price-Performance o f Computing, WALL St . J. O nline (Aug.
20, 2013, 1:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/video/ray-kurzweil-on-the-price-pcrformancc-of
-computing/C 1F2B611-4B92-469C-AA33-3129587EC113.html | https://perma.cc/X8DZ-A9FL |.
89. William D. Nordhaus, Two Centuries o f Productivity Growth in Computing, 67 .1.
Econ. H ist. 128, 128(2007).
90. Id. at 142-47.
91. See Lundstrom, supra note 28; Moore, supra note 28.
92. Lundstrom. supra note 28, at 210.
93. Indeed, some suggest that Moore’s Law is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy. E.g.,
llarro van Lente & Arie Rip, Expectations in Technological Developments: An Example o f
Prospective Structures To Be Filled in by Agency, in G etting N ew T echnologies T ogether :
Studies in Making Sociotechnical O rder 206 (Cornelis Disco & Barend van der Meulen
eds., 1998).
94. If this exponential trajectory continues to hold, by the end of this century, computing
power will be over one trillion times what it is now.
95. See, e.g., Todd Litman, Generated Traffic: Implications fo r Transport Planning, ITE
J., Apr. 2001. at 38; see also Thomas Liebig, Nico Piatkowski, Christian Bockermann &
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behave in almost all aspects of life. But the growth of data collection and analytics
will not be uniform in all areas of law. The evolution will be fastest where regulated
actors’ behavior is more frequent and more homogenous. In these situations,
lawmakers will have more data on how individuals behave. Where behavior is less
frequent and more heterogeneous, the predictability of behavior will initially be
weaker.
In the long run, however, artificially intelligent machines will not be bound by the
limits currently facing big data.9'’ Artificially intelligent machines are not simply pro
grammed with a given structure to anticipate every possible contingency and every
possible answer. Rather, artificially intelligent machines are trained to predict, infer,
and intuit behavior and adapt to new and unique situations.97
Artificially intelligent machines find “hidden” or “deep” connections in un
structured data to provide stronger predictions.98 In some sense, these machines are
capable of “learning.”99 They update to take into account whether their best guesses
are correct or not. In doing so, they amalgamate the wisdom of crowds.100 Artificially
intelligent machines marshal this wisdom better than traditional statistical techniques
because the machines craft their own learning rules, rather than relying on a poten
tially biased structure imposed by humans.101
2. Predictive Technology Will Displace Human Discretion
In the near future, more perfect algorithms will begin to displace lawmaker

Katharina Morik, Dynamic Route Planning with Real-Time Traffic Predictions, 64 Info. Sys.
258 (2017).
96. See, e.g., Daniela Rus, The Robots Are Coming: How Technological Breakthroughs
Will Transform Everyday Life, FOREIGN Aff., July/Aug. 2015, at 2. But see Martin Wolf, Same
as It Ever Was: Why Techno-Optimists Are Wrong, FOREIGN Aff., July/Aug. 2015, at 15
(providing a skeptical view).
97. See generally Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, A rtificial Intelligence: A
Modern A pproach (3d ed. 2009).
98. See, e.g., Geoffrey E. Hinton, Simon Osindero & Yee-Whye Teh, A Fast Learning
Algorithm for Deep Belief Nets, 18 N eural Computation 1527(2006).
99. Machine-learning algorithms learn by recognizing features, concepts, principles, and
ideas that humans instinctively recognize but find difficult to program or code. Rather than
having to structure a program in order to code rules, the rules are crafted and understood by
the artificially intelligent machine.
100. See J ames Surowiecki, T he W isdom of C rowds: W hy the Many A re Smarter
T han the Few and How C ollective W isdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and
N ations (2004).

101. Bias may affect algorithms that are based on traditional statistical techniques if some
errors are not observable. If the bias is not corrected, errors can be replicated and reinforced
by using the algorithm. But recently, a branch of artificial intelligence called evolutionary
computation has been developed to deal with such problems. Evolutionary algorithms, based
on techniques used by evolutionary biologists, use elements of trial and error to search for
globally optimal solutions, rather than simply optimizing with the existing space. Candidate
solutions are tested using an iterative process. See David B. Fogel, Introduction to
Evolutionary Computation, in E volutionary C omputation 1: Basic A lgorithms and
O perators ( Thomas Back, David B. Fogel & Zbigniew Michalewicz eds., 2000).
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discretion. While this displacement of human discretion may appear novel in the
legal sphere, it is simply a manifestation of the Moneyball phenomenon highlighted
by Michael Lewis. 102
In the book Moneyball, Lewis explores the use of data in major league baseball
to elucidate the idea that statistics and data, used correctly, are superior to human
judgment. Scouts and coaches in baseball previously relied on the “look” of the
player to predict whether a player would make it in the big leagues.10' But they were
wrong. Their hunches were really just manifestations of years of inherited biases,
prejudice, and outdated modes of thinking. Taking advantage of this, the Oakland
A’s used statistical analysis to consistently outperform rivals who had greater financial resources.
The lesson here is that humans and their hunches are unreliable. 105 Examples can
be found everywhere. From bankers assessing loan applicants106 and employers hir
ing prospective employees107 to commercial pilots flying planes, 108 humans increas
ingly place their trust in machines and discover that outcomes predicted by big data
are systematically better than human intuition.
The phenomenon is starting to permeate the field of law. Consider how judges set
bail. The decision to set bail has historically been based on a standard. The judge
weighed a number of factors, such as the seriousness of the alleged crime, the likeli
hood of guilt, whether the defendant had jumped bail before, the defendant’s social
ties and employment situation, the defendant’s mental condition, and so on . 109 The

102. Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003).
103. Id. at 32.
104. With limited financial resources, the A’s were able to make the playoffs year after
year by performing detailed statistical analyses of players to build a cost-elfective, winning
team that outperformed other teams with far higher payrolls. Lewis, supra note 102.
105. See K ahneman, supra note 20, at 4.
106. Bank managers who must decide whether or not to give a customer a loan have seen
their discretion dissolve. Banks have turned to predetermined rules about who can borrow and
how much they can borrow. The human bank manager is left with little discretion. The algo
rithm outperforms any individual bank manager in determining the viability o f a customer.
107. Employers that use statistical analyses when hiring workers make better hiring deci
sions than humans that make hiring decisions based on a one-hour interview. See, e.g., ChenFu Chien & Li-Fei Chen, Data Mining to Improve Personnel Selection and Enhance Human
Capital: A Case Study in High-Technology Industry, 34 Expert Sys. With Applications 280
(2008); Nathan R. Kuncel, David M. Klieger & Deniz S. Ones, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat
Instinct, FIarv. Bus. Rev., May 2014, at 32.
108. Commercial airline pilots rely heavily on autopilot technology and are instructed not
to take control of the airplane under certain circumstances. For example, the 2009 crash o f Air
France 447 into the Atlantic Ocean would have likely been prevented if the copilot did nothing
and did not touch the controls when the plane encountered turbulence. B ureau d ’Enquetes
e t d ’A nalyses Pour la Securitede l ’A viation C ivle, F inal Report on the Accident on
1st J une 2009 to the A irbus A330-203 Registered F-GZCP O perated by A ir F'rance
Flight AF447 Rio de J aneiro- P aris (2012), hltp://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601
,en/pdf/f-cp09060l.en.pdf [https://perma.ee/WYZ3-PA6l 11.
109.
See, for example, the standard in Massachusetts where bail is determined by

examining the alleged crime, the likely penalty, the likely flight risk, history of defaults, family
in the area, employment status, and previous criminal records, among other criteria. Mass
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list of potentially relevant factors is almost inexhaustible.110
But now some jurisdictions are turning to predictive technology to reduce un
certainty and inconsistency in judges’ decisions, as well as to reduce the time taken
to set bail.111 Algorithms have been developed that seek to predict when particular
defendants will likely skip bail.1" The predictive power of this algorithm, which
takes into account data on the defendant’s characteristics, far exceeds that of any
individual judge." ’
This output from the data is more systematic and reliable than an individual
judge’s hunch. The algorithm reduces error costs (it is better at assessing the likeli
hood of a defendant jumping bail) and decision costs (judges can simply apply the
algorithm). Judges without the algorithm have less information and cannot process
the information they do have as efficiently.
Moreover, judges introduce bias into the system by considering irrelevant factors.
A well-meaning judge may not even know when she is considering irrelevant factors.
A machine does not suffer from this problem. Relatedly, machines can be instructed
to ignore factors that we do not want the law to consider. Thus a machine can be told
to ignore race, gender, religion and the like even if they are relevant to an outcome
objective. It is much harder for a judge to affirmatively ignore subconscious impacts
of such factors."4
These observations run counter to the idea that there is something “special” and
“human” about the law and legal reasoning."5 Almost every profession thinks their
profession is special.116 In the same way that most drivers believe that they are above
average,"7 humans reflexively believe that their judgment and reasoning is special

G en. Laws Ann. ch. 276, § 57 (West 2015).

no.

id.
111. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formulafor Bail, N.Y. T imes (June
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/tuming-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science
.html [https://perma.cc/B267-HDQRI.
112. Id. Algorithms of this type are already in use in twenty-one jurisdictions across the
United States, in places such as Arizona, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
I 13. Recent work has illustrated the value of machine learning in reducing errors in grant
ing bail. Crime can be reduced by up to 24.8% with no change in jailing rates, or jail popula
tions can be reduced by 42.0% with no increase in crime rates. Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu
Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisions and
Machine Predictions, (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23180, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23180.pdf [https://peima.cc/QRG3-ZY6WI.
114. For machine algorithms, the instruction to ignore prohibited factors is not perfect.
Other allowed variables may perfectly correlate with and therefore inadvertently proxy for
out-of-bounds factors. These are sometimes called “clones.” To the extent a lawmaker wants
to exclude a factor from calculation, a programmer has to account for the correlation of clone
variables.
115. See Joseph Raz, Reasoning with Rules, 54 CURRENT Legal P robs. 1 (2001) (asking
what is special about legal reasoning).
116. See generally M ichael A. B ishop & J. D. T rout, Epistemology AND THE
Psychology of I Iuman J udgment 24-53 (2005) (humans instinctively deny or ignore the
success of such technology because of deep-seated cognitive biases, such as overconfidence
in our own abilities and judgments).
117. lain A. McCormick, Frank II. Walkey & Dianne E. Green, Comparative Perceptions

2017]

THE D E A T H OF R U L E S A N D S T A N D A R D S

1429

and that technology cannot replicate or replace their particular skill. In Moneyball,
baseball scouts thought that their ability to pick a future major league star would
outperform any statistical analysis."8 Doctors similarly think that doctors possess
special skills.119 The same is true of teachers.120 Lawyers too.121 Perhaps more sur
prisingly, legal scholars accustomed to looking for biases share this skewed we-arespecial belief.
Legal philosophers often contend that law is necessarily vague and indetermi
nate.122 Others argue that legal reasoning is different from other types of reasoning.12.
Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, suggests that legal reasoning requires an un
derstanding of the principles that underpin reasoning by analogy and has been skep
tical that artificial intelligence will be able to replicate this understanding.121
Professor Dan Kalian's 2006 address to the graduating class o f Yale Law School
provides a nice example of the argument that there is something “special” about
law.125 He contends that in order for lawyers to truly understand and evaluate legal
reasoning they need years of learning from “grandmasters” 126— such as professors
and senior lawyers— who inculcate students with the power of legal intuition and
judgment.127

o f Driver Ability—A Confirmation and Expansion, 18 Accident A nalysis & P revention
205, 206 (1986) (about eighty percent of drivers believe that they are better than the median
driver).
118. See Lewis, supra note 102, at 29-42.
119. See, e.g., Donald E. Polkinghorne, Practice and the H uman Sciences: T he
C ase for a J udgment-Based Practice of C are (2004); Samuel W. Bloom, Structure and
Ideology in Medical Education: An Analysis o f Resistance to Change, 29 J. H ealth & Soc.
B ehav. 294(1988).
120. See Franyoise Blin & Morag Munro, Why Hasn't Technology Disrupted Academics ’
Teaching Practices? Understanding Resistance to Change Through the Lens o f Activity
Theory, 50 COMPUTERS & Educ. 475 (2008).
121. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram o f Business Lawyering Judgments:
Toward a Theory o f Practical Metadisciplinarily, 4 1 SETON Hall L. Rev. 1 (2011).
122. See, e.g., T imothy A. O. Endicott, V agueness in Law 1 (2000) (“Although not all
laws are vague, legal systems necessarily include vague laws.”).
123. Lipshaw. supra note 121 (arguing that algorithmic judgment cannot replicate legal

reasoning).
124. Cass R. Sunstein, O f Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. C hi. Law Sch .
Roundtable 29,32-34 (2001) (suggesting that computer programs do not reason analogically
the way humans do); see also Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature
Disruption o f Legal Services, 2015 M ich. St. L. R ev. 1797, 1870 (suggesting that machines
are limited in their abilities to understand complex law and cannot perform well and “would
not play nice” where standards are currently the dominant form of law).
125. Dan M. Kahan, Deputy Dean and Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law
School Commencement Remarks (May 22, 2006), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ylsca [https://perma.ee/C9ZA-QB4C].
126. Id.', see also Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene
Lucci & Katherine Cheng, “Ideology ” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation
o f Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. Pa . L. Rev. 349. 355 (2016)
(testing whether judges have a unique “situation sense” expertise based on training and
experience).
127. Kahan. supra note 125.

1430

I NDI A NA L A W J O U R N A L

[Vol. 92:1401

Professor Kahan compares the profession of lawyers to the profession of chick
sexers who determine the gender of one-day old chicks. To the untrained eye, there
is nothing discernibly different about newborn male and female chickens. And yet
some people with training from a “chick-sexing grandmaster” can examine a chick
and tell whether it is male or female with ninety-nine percent accuracy. Amazingly,
no one (not even the chick sexers themselves) can say exactly what these experts are
looking for. They simply know the difference when they see it. Professor Kahan
claims that this “special power to intuitively perceive the gender of a newborn chick”
is analogous to how lawyers determine the difference between “good and bad deci
sions.” 128 Professor Kahan argues that lawyers learn how to reason in a special way,
and that is what makes the craft o f good lawyering so “distinctive” from other
professions.129
Within four years o f Professor Kahan’s address, the world of chick sexing had
changed dramatically. Predictive technology had been developed that could accu
rately determine the gender of a chick before birth.130 Just as the machines defeated
the grandmasters of chess and Jeopardy!, this new predictive technology bested the
grandmasters of chick sexing.
Professor Kahan’s address was not about the effect of technology on law. But the
fate of chick sexers illustrates a major point: there is nothing so special about indi
vidual human intuition— at least in practice—that makes it immune to displacement
by technology. Whether pure (unbiased and unrushed) human intuition is special and
beyond replication is an unresolved philosophical question. But in application, hu
man intuition is imperfect and biased. And machine technology can, it turns out, do
as well as humans even when the individuals themselves cannot adequately describe
their intuitive process.
The shortsighted belief that the legal profession is special and that lawyers and
judges are immune from displacement by technological advances hinges on a bias
that leads one to believe that only a human can deliver such wise judgments and
decisions. Yes, lawyers require judgment. Yes, judges require judgment. But, the
judgment of one human is outweighed by a decision generated by technology that
takes into account millions ofjudgments and decisions.13'
To see where this is all going for law, consider how artificially intelligent ma
chines may turn one of the most classic statements of a standard in U.S. legal doctrine
into a microdirective. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart found it very dif
ficult to precisely pin down what distinguished pornography from nonpornography
in determining the threshold test of obscenity.132 Instead, he simply wrote: “1 know
it when I see it.” 133

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Hey Little Hen, T he Economist: O nline Extra (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15491505 [https://perma.cc/8BLH-5P3W]. This new
predictive technology relies on the detection of estrogen in the yolk of an egg. Id.
131. See Surowiecki, supra note 100. One might also note that judgment is about making
the right decision in the absence of full information about outcomes. Once the outcomes are
known, that sort of judgment is in a sense unnecessary.
132. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184. 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
133. Id.
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Justice S tew art’s view suggests that distinguishing betw een pornography and
nonpornography is som ething that hum ans can do, but it is difficult to w rite an ex
ante rule that clearly defines the line. Justice S tew art preferred to leave the determ i
nation as a standard, to be resolved later.
A rtificially intelligent technology can already recognize and analyze im ag es.134 It
is not ju st a ju d g e w ho can “see it.” In the near future, artificially intelligent m achines
will be able to develop highly com plex rules that generate im m ediate and sim ple
predictions o f the legality o f particular m aterials (“this im age is/is not porno
graphic” ). Just im agine that Justice Stew art identified fifty pornographic im ages for
the com puter. At that point, the artificial intelligence program s can find deep con
nections to identify the pattern that is driving the distinction, but that Justice Stew art
could not articulate. Indeed, such pattern recognition is one o f the areas w here this
technology is already w ay ahead o f hum ans. And it is w hy the technology is thought
to be so valuable as a diagnostic tool.
If such technology w ere im plem ented, the law on the books m ight still look like
a standard; but an individual could refer to the m achine output to get advance m icro
directives and behave as though she w ere governed by a rule.
B. The F easibility o f C om m unication Technology
Can law m akers adequately give tim ely notice o f the law to regulated actors? Can
they provide these individuals with instant notice o f how best to com ply with the
law? In the sam e way that traffic lights let a driver know that she should stop, com 
m unication technology can give rise to a world w here all laws are reduced to stopgo directives that are instantly com m unicated to regulated actors. In this subsection,
w e discuss the types o f technology and infrastructure that will facilitate this.
The costs o f com m unication have been alm ost obliterated by the Internet. The socalled Internet o f T h in g s135 is an interconnected netw ork o f physical objects and de
vices that are em bedded with electronics and sensors to allow products to be con
trolled and used rem otely by the user or m anufacturer. Recent estim ates suggest that
betw een 50 billion to 100 billion objects and devices will be em bedded with such
technology by the year 20 2 0 .136 M obile applications are becom ing the first port o f

134.
Four Microsoft researchers have developed a visual recognition program that has an
error rate of 4.94%, less than the 5.1% error rate of a human. Kaiming He. Xiangyu Zhang,
Shaoqing Ren & Jian Sun, Delving Deep into Rectifiers: Surpassing Human-Level Perfor
mance on ImageNet Classification, 2015 IE E E I n t ’ l C o n f . ON COMPUTER VISION 1026,
http://www.cv-foundation.org/opcnaccess/contenticcv_2015/papers/FIe Delving D eepinto
_lCCV_2015_paper.pdf | https://perma.cc/PC3A-87SQI. According to one report, Japanese
cameras are even being used to identify whether subway passengers arc intoxicated. Amber
Bouman, Clever Cameras Detect Drunken Railway Passengers in Japan, ENGADGET (Aug.
13,2015), http://www.engadgct.com/2015/08/13/clever-cameras-detect-drunken-rai 1way-passengers
-in-japan/ [https://perma.cc/RW3E-DVKQI.
135. Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet o f Things' Thing, RFID J. (Jun. 22, 2009),
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view74986 | https://perma.cc/46LY-7SCS].
136. Maria Farrell, The Internet o f Things- - Who Wins, Who Loses?, G u a r d ia n (Aug. 14,
2015, 10:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/14/intcmct-of-things-winncrs
-and-losers-privacy-autonomy-capitalism [https://perma.ee/8T63-WR3F] (estimating 100
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call for gathering and processing information.1’7
The Internet of Things and mobile applications are not, however, simply ways to
improve the consumer experience. Lawmakers can use this technology. The Internet
will facilitate immediate communication between lawmakers, regulators, individu
als, and corporations. Take, for example, the field of environmental regulation. Regu
lators could more easily monitor emissions of factories through the Internet of
Things. Regulators could instantly determine when factories are exceeding their lim
its and quickly inform firms operating those factories of the violation.
The example of advance tax rulings above suggests that the IRS will be able to
provide immediate compliance information to individuals and corporations using
similar technology to the Internet of Things. Regulated actors could enter infor
mation into a web-based or mobile application and receive a ruling on a device (like
a phone) or some wearable technology (like a watch) from the regulator in a timely
manner.
Such infrastructure already exists. For example, cardiologists today can simply
refer to an app, enter in relevant information, and be given the optimal response for
a patient.138 As technology improves on the fact-gathering front, individuals may not
even be required to enter much data into the programs; rather, devices will simply
recognize the contours of the factual situation and give notice of whether the indi
vidual is complying with the law.
Indeed, lawmakers could even provide notice of microdirectives when the need
for it is immediate. Individuals could wear items, such as contact lenses, that instantly
analyze a situation and give an immediate directive as to the legality of a potential
action. The military is already experimenting with this type of technology for iden
tifying combat targets.139 But more mundane uses are also probable: Can you turn
left at an intersection? Can you cross the street? Can you attempt to board that sub
way car? And so on.
The Internet of Things drastically reduces the cost of a lawmaker communicating

billion embedded objects); Philip N. Howard. Sketching out the Internet o f Things Trendline,
B rookings: T echtank. (June 9, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank
/2015/06/09/sketehing-out-the-intcrnet-of-things-trendline/
[https://perma.cc/JZS6-ZVY8]
(estimating 50 billion embedded objects).
137. For example, there are 2.2 million different applications at the Apple App store and
2.8 million Google Play applications. See, e g.. Number o f Apps Available in Leading App
Stores as o f March 2017, Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of
-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/ [https://perma.ee/QCl.8-NUPWI.
138. Winslow, supra note 40 (noting the availability o f such an app launched by the
American College of Cardiology in June 2015).
139. In an attempt to avoid (or, at least, minimize) friendly fire and fratricide, military
scientists have developed combat identification technology (known as “Identification Friend
or Foe” or “IFF”) that can more easily and more quickly identify whether combatants are
friendly or enemies. For example, Lockheed Martin recently announced certification to
produce an IFF system for aircrews for the United States Department o f Defense. MEADS
System Gains Full Certification fo r Identifying Friend or Foe Aircraft, L ockheed Martin
(May 21, 2014), http://www.lockhecdmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2014/may/mfc-052114
-mcad-system-gains-full-ccrtification-identifying-friendfoe-aircrall.html | https://perma.cc/BU3H
-6V3N],
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with regulated actors. But the Internet o f Things does not just facilitate communica
tion. There is a feedback effect. The devices that form part o f the Internet o f Things
also collect data on how individuals and corporations behave. Lawmakers can gen
erate even better predictions o f human behavior by harnessing such data.140 In doing
so, the Internet of Things will further reinforce the feasibility o f the predictive
technology.
III. Implications and Consequences
In this Part, we explore some implications and consequences o f our predictions.
If microdirectives become the dominant form o f all law, these implications will be
profound. But even a short-run trend in isolated fields o f law will have major impacts
on the way we think about law. We will focus on the long-run version o f our predic
tion to demonstrate the scope o f possible changes.
We suggest that the microdirectives will emerge as a new form o f law that reduces
the uncertainty costs o f standards and the decision and error costs o f rules. There are,
however, other costs that may arise from a world o f microdirectives. While the law
will generate less uncertainty and fewer errors, it may be deficient in other ways.
Here, we identify four areas where the consequences and potential costs o f the emer
gence o f microdirectives may be substantial. First, it will change the broad institu
tional balance o f power in our political and legal system. Second, it may change the
development and substantive content o f legislative policy. Third, it will transform
the practice and training o f law. Fourth, it will have moral and ethical consequences
for individual citizens, altering their day-to-day decision-making process and chang
ing their relationship with lawmakers and government. In the remainder o f this Part,
we explore these implications and consequences in general terms. We conclude by
noting how the existence o f these costs may or may not affect our prediction.
A. The Death o f Judging? Institutional Changes to the Legal System
The death o f rules and standards will produce a shift in the balance o f our political
institutions. The proliferation o f clear microdirectives largely obviates the need for
ex post adjudication. This reduced role diminishes the ability o f judges to influence
the law and increases the power o f ex ante lawm akers.141 The change in the structure
o f the law does leave some room for some ex post adjudication o f evidentiary ques
tions, but even that will be reduced as the technology for observing facts ex ante
improves.

140. C f Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (discussing fact-gathering technology for
personalized default rules).
141. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 2, at 261 (“ The legislature’s choice whether to enact
a standard or a set of precise rules is implicitly also a choice between legislative and judicial
rulemaking.”); see also Schauer, supra note 3, at 3 10 (“According to the conventional wisdom,
therefore, the choice between rules and standards . . . is an important and powerful implement
of institutional design, determining much of who decides what in a complex and multiinstitutional society.”). In this sense, the death of rules and standards precedes the death of the
judicial function.

1434

INDIANA LAW J OURNAL

[Vol. 92:1401

This is potentially concerning because w hen ju d g es decide cases they do m ore
than sim ply apply rules or standards. T hey also have the ability to shift and m odify
the law. This can happen in at least three different w ays. First, ju d g es can interpret a
law (rule or standard) differently than the ex ante law m akers intended— assum ing
those law m akers even had an identifiable intent.142 Judges can also choose to ignore
rules and standards altogether in the guise o f interpretation.143
Second, ju d g e s can influence popular and institutional views about policy objec
tives. Judges can im pact popular opinion by highlighting a particular issue in a case,
using their position to m ake policy statem ents, or by issuing increm ental holdings
that generate support for m ovem ents that have broader co n seq u en ces.144 A ddition
ally, given the U.S. federal system , decisions o f courts in one ju risd ictio n m ight have
larger social consequences that impact nonjudicial change to policy objectives in
other ju risd ic tio n s.14 ' M any think that this role o f the courts in challenging stale and

142. On the ability o f judges to add their own interpretation, see— among many others
— Stanley F ish, Is T here a T ext in T his C lass? (1980); Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 132 U. Pa . L. R ev. 445 (1984); Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures Con
strain Judicial Interpretation o f Statutes?, 75 Va . L. R ev. 561 (1989); Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics o f Judging, 54 S. C al. L. Rev . 151, 251-52 (1981); Frederick Schauer, An Essay
on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. R ev. 797 (1982). But see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991).
The idea that legislative intent exists is not obvious. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress
Is a “They, ” Not an “I t”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev . L. & ECON. 239
(1992).
143. See, e.g., Anthony Niblett & Albert 11. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 Wm . & Mary
L. Rev . 1789, 1795 (2016) (finding that Court of Appeals judges lean towards citing prece
dents that align with the political composition of the panel); Anthony Niblett & Albert H.
Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study o f Dissent, 42 Int ’l Rev . of L. & Econ . 60,64-67 (2015)
(showing that different judges writing different opinions in the same case cite different prece
dents and lean toward precedents that align with each judge’s political preference); William
Hubbard & M. Todd Henderson, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test o f Congres
sional Control Over Judicial Behavior (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Working Paper No.
671,2014). But see Anthony N iblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal
Decisions?: A Statistical Examination, 70 M u L. Rev . 234 (2010).
144. The legitimation hypothesis suggests that public opinion will begin to converge
toward the opinion of the court after a court has handed down a decision. See, e.g., Brandon
L. Bartels & Diana C. Mulz, Explaining Processes o f Institutional Opinion Leadership, 71 J.
POL. 249 (2009); Valerie Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An Experimental
Study o f the Court’s Ability To Change Opinion, 23 A m . Pol . Q. 109 (1995). There is prominent
literature discussing “backlash” to court decisions that have the opposite effect of the
legitimation hypothesis. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Now Brown Changed Race Relations:
The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. Am . Hist. 81 (1994). Others suggest that the effect is more
constrained. See, e.g., G erald N. Rosenberg, T he Hollow Hope : Can Courts B ring
A bout Social C hange? (1991). Further, court decisions can polarize opinion. See Charles H.
Franklin, & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 A m . Pol . Sci. R ev . 751 (1989); Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D.
Martin, The Publics Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 A m. Pol . Sci .
Rev. 299(1998).
145. For example, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that same-sex
marriage was legal. Goodridge v. Dep’to f Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Scholars
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entrenched views has a salutary effect on our dem ocracy.1*&
'"
Finally, judges can outright declare policy objectives to be improper or un
constitutional.147 This judicial review o f legislative policy is considered by many to
be an integral part o f our system o f checks and balances.148
These lawmaking roles o f judges will change along with the fundamental nature
o f law. Judges will lose much o f their oversight and lawmaking power. For non
constitutional questions, the interpretive role may disappear entirely."9 They will no
longer have the power to reinterpret or ignore laws. The policy objectives o f law will
be set by the ex ante rule makers (legislative or regulatory). And the judiciary— at
least if it maintains its current form and structure— will have little or no occasion to
question or change those policy objectives. The opportunities for statutory interpre
tation and filling in the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply
instructed to obey simple directives.

have debated the effect that this decision had on public opinion and whether the subsequent
change in public opinion set the law on a new path, culminating in the Supreme Court of the
United States finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage in 2015. See M ichael J.
Klarman, F rom the C loset to the A ltar: C ourts, Backlash, and the Struggle for
Same-S ex M arriage 89-118 (2013); Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily & Kevin Wallsten,
Gay Rights, in Public O pinion and Constitutional C ontroversy 234,239-245 (Nathaniel

Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash:
Assessing the Impact o f Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 Law & Soc’YR ev. 151 (2009);
Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics o f Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and
Now, 82 S. C al. L. Rev. 1153 (2009).
146. See generally A lexander M. Bickel, T he L east Dangerous Branch (Yale Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PlJB. L. 279 (1957).
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Origins o f Judicial Review, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2003) (“In
[Marbury v. Madison], as it is often taught in law schools, the Supreme Court created its
authority to declare federal statutes unconstitutional.”).
148. See John Hart Ely , Democracy and D istrust: A T heory of J udicial Review
(1980); Barry Friedman, The Importance o f Being Positive: The Nature and Function o f Judi
cial Review, 72 U. ClN. L. Rev . 1257 (2004) (discussing the role that judicial review plays in
our legal system); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission o f Judicial Review, 76 U. C hi.
L. Rev . 859 (2009) (explaining the role of judicial review in democratic government). There
are, of course, strong critics ofjudicial review. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into the Political Safeguards o f Federalism, 100 Colum . L. R ev. 215, 233-37 (2000);
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 FIarv. L.
R ev. 5 (2001) (critiquing modem conceptions of judicial review and judicial supremacy);
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 D uke L. J. 1, 38-45
(collecting sources on the question of the legitimacy ofjudicial review).
149. Deciding nonconstitutional questions is the bulk of what judges do. Constitutional
questions, while high profile, reflect a small fraction of the judicial caseload. Even in the
Supreme Court of the United States, the percentage of cases has not exceeded fifty percent in
recent years. See R ichard A. Posner, Flow J udges T hink 271 (2008). The number is far lower
in state courts. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Constitutional Litigation in the United States, in
C onstitutional Courts in C omparison 25, 28 (Ralf Rogowski & Thomas Gawron eds.,
2002) (noting that over the period 1940-1970, only 14.6% of state court cases had constitu
tional issues).
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t he concern here is a separate question than whether machine-aided algorithms
can implement policy objectives. The question is whether there is an independent
branch of government with the power to question the policy decisions of the ex ante
lawmakers. When the lawmakers decide on legislative objectives and parameters for
the machine algorithms, do we want a separate branch of government to review those
decisions? If we do, the reduced role of the judiciary is troubling.
Moreover, the number of cases litigated will plummet. The question in most cases
will simply be whether or not the citizen complied with the simple directive. The
case will have two questions: Was the light red? And did the citizen stop? The evi
dence to answer those questions will continue to be more readily accessible. As the
number of cases and controversies litigated falls and the interpretation of policy be
comes unnecessary, a judge’s opportunities to use a case to make policy statements
and impact opinion will diminish. On the other hand, the judge’s opportunities to
inject bias and error will also diminish.150
Things are a little more complicated for questions of constitutional law. In theory
at least, constitutional standards151 are no different from the standards we have dis
cussed throughout this Article. A machine could easily be programmed to tell us
whether a particular search was unreasonable,152 whether certain speech was pornog
raphy, whether microdirectives are valid under the commerce clause or some other
provision, and so on.
There are institutional structures, however, that may appear to be barriers to the
promulgation of microdirectives for constitutional review. As our regime currently
stands, neither Congress nor any agency can dictate that a machine algorithm will
decide the constitutionality of laws. If Congress creates an algorithm that takes into
account race or results in the prohibition of speech, the courts—and not a machine—
would declare those algorithms unconstitutional.
As long as Marbury v. Madison15’ remains good law, the constitutional decision
on an algorithm would have to come from the judiciary. But the courts could, of
course, bless the use of particular types of algorithms going forward, deeming these
to be constitutionally proper. For example, an exigent search that was conducted pur
suant to a machine directive could be presumed to be reasonable if the machine used
a judicially blessed algorithm. This precedential guidance to regulatory agencies154
could essentially provide the policy objectives that must guide the microdirective
technology for constitutional review. This delegation would facilitate the promulga
tion of microdirectives in the constitutional law space.
Some, of course, may argue that reducing judicial power over policy is a good
thing. As the democratically elected branches become more powerful, for example,
fears about overreaching by unelected judges will be dampened.155 Others will

150. See supra Part II.
151. The U.S. Constitution generally operates through standards. Schauer, supra note 3, at 308.
152. Cf. Michael I,. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. Rev. 871 (2016).
153. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137(1803).
154. We discuss this type of second-order regulation above. See supra Part I.C.l.
155. See, e.g., Larry D. K ramer, T he People T hemselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and J udicial R eview (2004); see also sources cited supra note 148.
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disagree.156 For those who advocate the active role of judges, alternative mechanisms
for that role might be pursued. Perhaps a judiciary that provides advisory opinions
on legislative and regulatory policy decisions could preserve the judiciary’s oversight
and influence on society.157
B. The Development and Substance o f Policy Objectives
In addition to policy decisions moving away from judges, the process by which
legislatures and regulators make those decisions will change.
Broader objectives. As we noted above in Part I.D., regulatory agents will be the
primary force behind the shift to microdirectives. Legislatures may continue to enact
standards, but they will leave the machine-aided implementation to regulators. Those
standards may be nothing more than a statement of the policy objective that should
guide the rule-making machines. Regulators will then translate that broad objective
into specific sets of rules generated by machines.158
Additionally, the ability to achieve broad goals through machine-derived micro
directives will potentially allow legislatures to state their objectives at increasingly
higher levels of abstract social policy. Rather than concern themselves with details
of implementation, the legislature will be able to concentrate on the bigger picture.
For example, instead of worrying about specific speed limits, the legislature will fo
cus on the purpose of traffic law: does society want laws that reduce accidents, mini
mize travel time, reduce fuel consumption, or some perfect mix?
At its extreme, learning algorithms aided by big data could be asked to prescribe
a vast set of microdirectives covering multiple fields to achieve an even broader so
cial goal, such as maximizing welfare, minimizing accidental death, minimizing
wealth inequality, or (more likely) some combination that sets certain acceptable
thresholds for these and other social values. This becomes possible because lawmak
ers no longer have to figure out and set out each precise rule and its connection to
other rules. Instead, machines will work out the millions of connected micro
directives that achieve a stated slate of policy objectives. This complex catalog of
microdirectives can be targeted to small instances of behavior that fit within a larger
web of behavioral actions to achieve a broad goal.
Faster change. Algorithm-driven laws will automatically and rapidly adapt to the
circumstances, optimizing according to the objective of the law. But changes to the
law result in winners and losers.119 Frequent changes to the law may impose addi
tional risks on individuals and may affect the willingness of individuals to invest in

156. See sources cited supra note 148.
157. On the other hand, it is possible that the influence on society requires actual cases
and controversies to make judicial rulings more salient.
158. See Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Regulation by Machine. 18
J. Machine Learning & R es. (forthcoming 2017).
159. See, e.g., M ichael. J. T rebilcock, Dealing with Losers : T he Political Economy
of Policy T ransitions 1-3 (2014) (discussing how changes in legal policy that are not com
pensating reduces the incentive to make optimal investments); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis o f Legal Transitions. 99 II arv. L. Rev. 509 (1986) (providing an economic analysis
of the gains and losses created by legal transitions); Louis Kaplow, Government Relieffor Risk
Associated with Government Action. 94 Scandinavian J. Econ . 525 (1992) (exploring and
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projects that may be subject to legal uncertainty.160 A smart machine will, however,
be able to take into account any effects on the values of reliance investments to find
a global optimum, rather than merely a local optimum.
Moreover, predictive technology can be used to advise lawmakers on other po
tential unintended consequences of certain policy objectives. Under today’s system,
laws frequently have unintended consequences. Laws that change behavior in un
expected ways that undermine the law’s goal or disrupt some unrelated area of hu
man behavior in unexpected ways are common.161
With the current state of technology, it often takes years before the consequences
of a policy decision are fully understood. But as big data and predictive technology
improve, lawmakers will be able to more accurately identify these consequences at
the time when they make the rules.162
Unintended consequences. The potential for unintended consequences highlights
an important facet of the death of rules and standards. Those who set the broad poli
cies in this new world will need to have deep understandings of both social objectives
and the way that these technologies work. Machine-generated microdirectives can
only reduce unintended consequences if the machines are programmed to identify
the types of consequences about which policymakers or society care. The humans
who instruct machines to create microdirectives must communicate policy objectives
to the machines in ways that do not distort the message, and they must “ask” the
machines to provide assessments of the consequences of proposed objectives.
If lawmakers do not have a deep understanding of policy consequences and pro
gramming, the machines may distort rather than further law.163 Such concerns ani
mate many science-fiction movies about the fears of artificial intelligence.164 The

modeling the costs imposed by government transitions).
160. The fact that such uncertainty leads to a reduced ex ante investment is a manifestation
of the hold-up problem. See generally Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence o f
Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 Econometrica 449 (1984); Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Foundations o f Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev . Econ. Stud . 115 (1999); Jean
Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. POL. ECON. 235 (1986).
161. See generally Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences o f Purposive So
cial Action, 1 Am. Soc . Rev. 894 (1936). An example of a recent legislative change with un
intended consequences occurred when the Ontario government increased access to the small
claims court, which had a regressive effect, with richer plaintiffs displacing poor plaintiffs.
See Anthony Niblett & Albert 11. Yoon, Unintended Consequences: The Regressive Effects o f
Increased Access to Courts, 14 J. E mpirical L egal Stud . 5 (2017).
162. The technology may, however, get ahead of itself. While predictive technology re
duces the chance of unintended consequences for any given law, it also increases the rate at
which laws can be promulgated. If the rate of promulgation increases fast enough, unintended
consequences may increase even as laws become more accurate. We must know more about
how eager lawmakers will be to promulgate microdircctives to understand how significant this
risk is.
163. In the literature on artificial intelligence, this is referred to as “perverse instantiation.”
See, e.g., N ick Bostrom, S uperintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, 146-49(2014).
164. Such dystopian visions of the future are found in many popular books and movies.
See, e.g., Isaac A simov, I, Robot (1950); 2001: A Space O dyssey (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1968); Robocop (Orion Pictures 1987); T erminator 2: J udgment Day (Carolco Pictures
1991). See generally lllah Reza Nourbakhsh, The Coming Robot Dystopia: All Too Inhuman,
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current debate about G oogle driverless cars highlights these concerns. M any have
questioned how one should program a self-driving car to deal w ith ethical decisions
about the value o f life .165 Can G oogle cars, they ask, deal w ith ethical questions that
face hum an drivers? O ne com m entator notes that hum ans believe that avoiding a
collision w ith a dog is m ore im portant than avoiding a collision with anim als that are
not pets (like sq u irrels).166 But m achines— if program m ed correctly— could replicate
that value ju d g m en t and, given the advances in predictive technology, w ould execute
the ju d g m en t w ith greater accuracy than a hum an. On the other hand, if the com m en
tator is w rong— and squirrels are to be avoided with the sam e care as dogs— then the
program can be changed accordingly."’7 The key, then, is in the law m aker’s ability
to program that value into the m achines.
Still, som e appear to w orry that poorly program m ed cars will im plem ent a fright
ening system o f social values w here they sw erve to kill the “w rong” p eo p le.16* Im
plicit in this critique, how ever, is the false idea that hum an drivers alw ays sw erve to
kill the “ right” people. It w ould seem that the trick in getting all o f this right is not in
program m ing the com puter, but in som ehow agreeing on w hich people are the
“right” ones to kill. T hat is an age-old m oral problem to w hich w e still do not have
an agreed-upon answ er. Thus, the so-called “trolley problem ” 169 is, indeed, a real one
for self-driving cars. But that is a fam iliar critique on the lim its o f hum an ethics, not
on the lim its o f self-driving cars. In other w ords, it is still a problem for hum andriven cars too.

Foreign Aff ., July-Aug. 2015, at 23.
165. See, e.g.. Chris Bryant, Driverless Cars Musi Learn To Take Ethical Route, F in .
T imes (Mar. I, 2015), http://www.ft.eom/intl/cms/s/0/4ab2ccle-b752-lle4-981d-00144feab7de
[https://perma.ee/D6V9-BEFS]; Patrick Lin, The Ethics o f Autonomous Cars, Atlantic (Oct.
8, 2013), http://www.thcatlantic.com/technology/archive/20l3/10/the-cthics-of-autonomous
-cars/280360/ [https://perma.cc/QQ7V-D4C3].
166. A Point o f View: The Ethics o f the Driverless Car, BBC: Mag . (Jan. 24, 2014),
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25861214 | https://perma.cc/A847-2J RJ |.
167. Janet D. Stcmwedel. Building Self-Driving Cars That Drive Ethically, Forbes (Aug.
5, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/05/building-self
-driving-cars-that-drive-ethically/1https://perma.cc/2QRI 1-31J5B | (noting that Google is con
sulting with moral philosophers).
168. See Tanay Jaipuria, Self-Driving Cars and the Trolley Problem, Hufeington Post :
Blog (June 1.2015, 12:13 PM), http://www.hufllngtonpost.com/lanay-jaipuria/self-driving-cars
-and-lhe-trolley-problem b 7472560.html | https://perma.cc/CP4M-5GC4] (asking whether
cars can make ethical decisions that must value different lives and whether they should favor
the life of their owner); Tim Worstall, When Should Your Driverless Car from Google Be
Allowed To Kill You?, Forbes (June 18, 2014, 8:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/timworstall/2014/06/18/whcn-should-your-driverless-car-from-google-be-allowed-to-kill-you/
[https://perma.cc/ZL3N-4A9H] (same).
169. The trolley problem can take different forms but usually presents the question of what
one would do if a trolley is on track to kill a group of people and the observer can pull a lever
that will divert the trolley to a different course that will kill one (different) person, thus saving
the group. On the trolley problem, see generally, Philippa Foot, The Problem o f Abortion and
the Doctrine o f the Double Effect, in V irtues and V ices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy (1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 Y ale L.J.
1395 (1985).
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In any event, lawmakers o f the future must be able to translate society’s values
into programmable objectives for the machines. The task o f identifying those values,
it seems to us, will remain a human one.170
C. Changes to the Practice o f Law
The observations thus far lead naturally to the next related observation: the death
o f rules and standards will fundamentally transform the practice o f law. For years, a
chorus o f scholars have been pointing out that technology will disrupt and transform
the practice o f law .171 We join this chorus to note that as lawmakers adopt laws that
are translated and communicated to citizens as simple microdirectives, the role o f
lawyers will change dramatically. The role o f compliance and litigation lawyers will
diminish, while the role o f a lawyer as lobbyist or policy advisor will grow.
The compliance lawyer today serves as an intermediary who advises a client on
how best to comply with complex rules or vague standards. Part o f the expertise o f a
compliance lawyer is in predicting how an ex post adjudicator will likely apply the
relevant standard to a certain set o f facts.
Thus, in our tax example, a client might ask a lawyer whether or not her business
arrangement complies with the standards o f the tax code. In our medical example, a
doctor might ask a lawyer whether her diagnostic procedures would be deemed rea
sonable under the controlling legal standard. The lawyer reads the relevant law and
exercises her judgm ent— based on education, experience, and other expertise— to
provide a prediction. The lawyer may go beyond a yes or no answer and suggest
creative ways that a client could alter behavior to increase the likelihood that the
adjudicator would find the client in compliance.
Technology will reduce the need for such compliance lawyers. The citizen will
simply be told directly whether behavior complies with the law or not. There is no
need to consult a lawyer to ask whether a traffic light is green or red. Similarly, liti
gators will no longer be in the business o f arguing about the application o f standards,
and judges will no longer be in the business o f applying them.
There will be skeptics. As discussed above in Part II, even though technology has
already displaced many labor markets, there is a common sentiment that many hold
that their profession is different and somehow immune to technological disrup
tions.172 But simply noting that a compliance lawyer’s role as information middleman
will disappear is not to say that the entire profession o f law will be automated. Rather,
there will be a shift in the types o f tasks that lawyers are charged with. Lawyers will
be forced to adapt to the new environment.
Setting the policy directives o f a machine algorithm is complicated. To tell a ma
chine that its objective is to minimize traffic accidents, without more, would lead to

170. There is a possibility that machines could simply observe human behavior and from
that deduce what objectives the majority of persons would do and follow that behavior. That
would eliminate even the need for human policy considerations. We reject that possibility
—not because the computers cannot do it. but because few would agree that entrenching ob
served majoritarian behavior is the appropriate objective of law.
171. E.g., Susskind, T omorrow ’s Lawyers, supra note 11; Henderson, supra note 11;
Katz, supra note 11; Ribstein, supra note 11.
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
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standstill traffic— or, more absurdly, the prohibition o f motor vehicles. Instructing
the machine to minimize travel times could lead to an abundance o f car accidents. A
machine can only write rules to meet the objective as it is presented. As we have
discussed, the humans who set the objective must be able to understand the conse
quences o f different objectives and must be able to understand which objectives are
desirable.
Understanding the implications o f different objectives requires not only an under
standing o f the technology, but also a highly interdisciplinary understanding o f hu
man behavior and the goals o f our regulatory state. The trend o f the last fifty years
toward interdisciplinary legal education,17’ with an emphasis on understanding topics
such as economics, psychology, philosophy, history, and so on, is one that will serve
this new role o f lawyers well. We note in passing that recent countertrends toward
so-called practical lawyering174 are likely to be wasteful. The idea o f training lawyers
solely in practical skills provides little benefit when the skills required are likely to
change rapidly. The understanding o f legal policy should remain the focus o f the
legal endeavor because human individuals will set the high-level policy objectives
for the law .175
D. The Broader Consequences o f These Technologies on Individuals
The death o f rules and standards will raise major concerns about privacy, auton
omy, and the ethics o f human decision making.

173. See generally Robin L. West, T eaching Law: J ustice, Politics, and the D emands
OF P rofessionalism (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. I R ev 34, 34-35 ( 1992) (documenting the rise
of “law and” movements being taught at law schools); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a
Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S.
C al.L. Rev . 1231 (1991); Anthony D’Amato, The Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education
(Nw. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 06-32, 2006). https://ssm.com/abstract
=952483 [https://pcrma.cc/C54C-2XVM].
174. See W illiam M. Sullivan, A nne Colby, J udith Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond &
Lee S. Shulman, E ducating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 12 (2007);
R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now,
53 B.C. L. Rev . 1515 (2012); Joe Palazzolo, Law-School Program Emphasizes Practical
Skills, W all St . J. (Jan. 4, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/law-school-program
-emphasizes-practical-skills-1420419113 [https://perma.cc/Y6X6-B2HU |.
175. To be clear, this is not a technological limitation. Policy will be set by humans rather
than machines because that is the one area where humans will resist technological advances
most strongly. There are, of course, many who think all aspects of life will inevitably be
controlled by artificial intelligence. See, e.g., Ray Kurzweil, T he S ingularity Is N ear: When
Humans T ranscend Biology (2005). Others are skeptical. See, e.g., Peter Murray, Leading
Neuroscientist Says Kurzweil Singularity Prediction a "Bunch o f Hot Air", SINGULARITY HUB
(Mar. 10, 2013), https://singularityhub.com/2013/03/10/leading-ncuroscientist-says-kurzweil
-singularity-prediction-a-buneh-of-hot-air/ [https://perma.cc/M68W-HX9VI. In any case, the
power over ultimate policy objectives will be one of the last things that humans cede to
machines.
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1. Privacy
Most obviously, as with all applications of big data, the use of data gathering to
predict outcomes raises privacy concerns.176 These concerns have been addressed
extensively in other contexts.177 In our context, the potential for invasions of privacy
is high. Government-controlled machines will be gathering data about individual be
havior and using that information in two ways. First, they will use the information to
assess an individual’s behavior and provide a legal directive. Second, they will use
the information as part o f its aggregated data that goes into setting the micro
directives. Stoplight cameras and GPS tracking already create the ability for the gov
ernment to know a citizen’s comings and goings. These capabilities to invade privacy
will increase. And the concerns become greater when the government uses the infor
mation it gathers in conjunction with technology to predict future actions by an
individual.178
There is a trade-off here. The more limitations placed on the government’s ability
to gather information, the weaker will be its ability to create precise micro
directives.179 Moreover, there may be privacy-based calls for the halting o f micro
directives because the mere prediction based on aggregate data violates principles of
privacy.
The debate and policy choices on privacy here are likely to track general debates
and choices about privacy and big data. One can also expect that as individuals con
tinue to waive privacy in private-law contexts,180 public law will be given additional
freedom to gather information that facilitates the evolution of microdirectives.

176. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 136 (investigating the effect of the Internet of Things on
privacy and autonomy, suggesting that they will become the preserve of the powerful).
177. The literature on this new topic is already vast. See Privacy, B ig Data, and the
Public Good (Julia Lane, Victoria Stoddcn, Stefan Bender & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 2014);
Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question o f Technology, 22 Law & Phil. 119 (2003); Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises o f Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure o f Anonymization, 57
UCLA L. R ev . 1701 (2010); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. C al. L. Rev . 1125 (2015);
Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits o f Big Data, 161 U. P a . L. Rev . O nline
339 (2013); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1467-68; Richard A. Posner, Privacy,
Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. C hi. L. R ev. 245 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy
in the Cloud, 161 U .P a . L. Rev. 1623 (2013); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the SecurityLiberty Debate, 75 U. Cm. L. Rev. 343 (2008); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for
All: Privacy and User Control in the Age o f Analytics, 11 Nw. J. T ech & Intell. P rop. 239
(2013); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age o f Big Data: A Time for Big
Decisions, 64 Stan. L. Rev . O nline 63 (2012).
178. The U.S. government has started to investigate the benefits and costs of using big
data. See Exec. O ffice of the P resident, B ig Data: Seizing O pportunities, Preserving
V alues (2014).
179. C f Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1467-68 (noting the trade-off between
privacy protections and “granular personalized default rules”). As predictive technology gets
better, less and less personal data will be necessary to create precise microrules. But some
information gathering will always be necessary.
180. See id. at 1468 (noting that “most consumers bring strongly pragmatic perspectives
to privacy tradeoffs, and they are increasingly willing to share information about themselves
when the benefits from sharing are increased and the threats from sharing are diminished”).
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2. A utonom y
As law m akers prom ulgate m ore precise m icrodirectives to advance broad policy
objectives, the scope o f law can expand. Take, for exam ple, a broad policy objective
that seeks to increase productivity. In the hands o f a pow erful algorithm , m icro
directives aim ed at a broad goal like that could dictate virtually every decision in a
citizen ’s life. Sm art traffic lights could decide w ho goes first based on productivity
levels. Sm art restaurants could dictate w hat a citizen is allow ed to eat for b reak fast.181
This presents real concerns for individual au to n o m y .182
But these concerns are not direct objections to the use o f predictive technology.
Rather they are objections to reckless law m aking or to overreaching. Law m akers
have to understand w hat objectives to use in setting m icrodirectives. Improving
productivity m ight be one policy objective, but there m ay be other constraining ob
jectives that should be factored in, such as respecting certain spheres o f individual
decision m aking. If principles o f hum an autonom y require the law to allow hum ans
to m ake certain decisions even w hen those decisions are inconsistent with other so
cial values, then the law m akers m ust be aw are o f those principles and avoid en 
croaching on them w hen they set policy objectives. T his reinforces the im portance
o f law yers and law m akers as interdisciplinary policy experts.
T he w ell-trained expert law m aker m ight still overreach. T he technologies we
have described provide the tools for alm ost lim itless law m aking. A goal to increase
productivity at all costs is difficult to enact through legislation today— the infor
m ation costs are too high. But that will not be the case with m icrodirectives. As the
inform ation lim its on law m aking fall, it will only be political costs that restrain those
in pow er. As in our discussion o f the dim inished role o f ju d g es, this once again coun
sels in favor o f attention to institutional structures.
A final and perhaps even deeper concern is that law m akers may turn the m icro 
directives into actual physical restraints on action. Rather than tell you that the light
is red, the technology o f the future m ay sim ply prevent your car from m oving. A self
driving car with no d river override could be entirely in the control o f the law m aker.181

181. There is no doubt that such outcomes would be controversial, as the debate over the
“broccoli” analogy in the Affordable Care Act litigation demonstrated. See James B. Stewart,
How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. T imes (June 23, 2012). http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-bccame-a-symbol-in-the-health-care-dcbate
.html [https://perma.cc/J9LD-P.IWG]. Another example can be found in New York City’s “bigsoda ban.” See Michael M. Grynbaum, New York’s Ban on Big Sodas Is Rejected by Final
Court, N.Y. T imes (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/nyregion/city-loses
-final-appeal-on-limiting-sales-of-large-sodas.html | https://pcrma.cc/D9TE-VD4Z].
182. The concept of autonomy in law and philosophy is deeply controversial. See, e.g.,
Sarah C only, A gainst A utonomy: J ustifying Coercive P aternalism (2013). Professor
David Strauss has noted that “autonomy is a notoriously vague notion; there is a danger that
any attempt to justify a principle in terms of autonomy will slip into question-begging
assertions about the nature of truly free and rational human beings.” David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom o f Expression, 91 C olum . L. R ev. 334, 354 (1991). Still,
there is no question that individual autonomy is implicated by the power o f the state to create
limitless microdirectives to achieve virtually any legislative objective.
18.3. Additional concerns would arise if individuals do not know who owns the controlling
technology. See Dan Gillmor, In the Future, the Robots May Control You, and Silicon Valley
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As the Internet o f Things continues to expand, this could be true o f m ost daily
actions.
From a technological perspective, the m ove from m icrodirectives to autom atic
restraint is sm all. From an ethical and policy perspective, how ever, it is enorm ous.
T he benefits o f such a m ove include increased com pliance and increased certainty,
w hile the costs arrive by w ay o f a large loss o f individual autonom y. O ne m ight think
such a rule w ere appropriate if the restraint kept a gun from firing in a situation that
w ould be m urder. But things w ould be different if the rule related to som ething less
m alicious like parking in an illegal spot outside a hospital in an em ergency or som e
thing m undane like crossing a neighborhood street. O ur prediction about the death
o f rules and standards does not necessarily im ply prior restraint, w hich is a topic that
needs to be addressed sep arately .184
3. Ethics
T here m ay be additional concerns that the death o f rules and standards will erode
m oral decision m aking. Som e argue that individuals who solely follow rules and di
rectives will becom e robotic— m ere autom atons w ho fail to appreciate the moral
choices that should underlie their ac tio n s.185 This is a point m ade by Professor
S h iffrin .'86 Forcing individuals to engage in m oral deliberation may be im portant to
the moral health o f individuals or o f a dem ocratic society. If this is true, the death o f
rules and standards will bring w ith it significant costs. We are skeptical that anyone
could stop this evolution, so the appropriate response is likely to seek out alternative
outlets for hum an moral deliberation and take that into account in the process o f
determ ining the appropriate boundaries o f the law.
Finally, people are generally uncom fortable w ith allow ing m achines to m ake im
portant ethical decisions. As discussed above, the debate about G oogle driverless
cars dem onstrates th is.187 In that context, many have already begun to ask w hether it
is acceptable for a m achine to m ake com plex ethical decisions about life or d eath .188
If w e bracket Professor S hiffrin’s concerns about m oral atrophy, the source o f co n 
cern appears to arise from a sense that hum ans have a unique ability to m ake ethical

Will Control Them, G uardian (May 13, 2014, 6:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2014/may/13/intemet-or-things-software-privacy-silicon-valley |https://penna.cc
/FMA3-TYL8] (noting that autonomy, security, and privacy seem to be an afterthought of the
move towards the Internet of Things).
184. See Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 I Iarv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol ’y 795 (2013).
185. See, e.g., Evan Selinger & Brett Frisehmann, Will the Internet o f Things Result in
Predictable People?, G uardian (Aug. 10, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/aug/10/intemet-of-things-predictable-people [https://perma.cc/29C7-5CURI
(noting that people will essentially become programmable, like machines).
186. Shiffrin, supra note 10; cf. Larry A lexander & Emily Sherwin, T he R ule of
Rules: Morality, R ules, and the D ilemmas of Law (2001) (investigating the dilemma cre
ated between individual moral judgment and rules that restate moral principles in concrete
terms).
187. See supra Part 1ILB.
188. See supra Part I1I.B.

2017]

THE DEATH OF RULES AND STANDARDS

1445

decisions. 189 It should be noted, however, that even when a machine is making an
algorithmic calculation these are human decisions. Humans decide which values the
machine considers. Humans tell it what its objective is.
But that does not necessarily alleviate the concern. There is perhaps an ethical
value in having a human making important instant decisions rather than placing our
selves on a course of action that cannot be reviewed in the actual moment. We sus
pect that a large part of what is going on here is lingering skepticism about accuracy
concerns, which we addressed in Part II. People often trust human hunches more than
complex machine decisions even in the face of evidence that the machines are more
accurate. Perhaps it is a fear of the unknown. But as we have noted above, there is
little evidence that humans will be systematically better at making these decisions
than machines.
Still a deeper philosophical problem remains. Something that makes us human
might be lost when lawmakers use machines to make all of our collective value judg
ments in advance (even if those judgments are accurate) . 190 This may be at the root
of the fear with which people view artificial intelligence.
These are pressing ethical problems that will face lawmakers in the future. The
current trend is toward microdirectives that reduce in-the-moment ethical decisions.
To understand whether that is a good thing, lawmakers must engage with philoso
phers and ethicists on these questions as the evolution to machine-derived micro
directives progresses.
*

*

*

Before concluding, it is worth noting an implicit assumption in our prediction: the
implications and consequences we discuss here will not themselves prevent the death
of rules and standards. One might think that if the institutional upheaval and auton
omy concerns are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move to microdirectives.
We do not see this happening. The growth of predictive technology is robust. The
lure of accuracy (“getting things right”) and the regulated actors’ desire for certainty
are powerful forces that will dominate political and legal debates. The more nuanced
considerations we discuss in this Part will, we think, be sidelined.
In that sense, our prediction is about the law’s current course. Those who believe
the costs of that course are unacceptable should focus on methods of alleviating these
costs or finding means to intervene and change that evolutionary path.
C o n c lu sio n

As machines become increasingly intelligent, and continue to outperform human
judgment, the influence of artificial intelligence will spread far and wide. The tech
nologies we have discussed are already being used by doctors to detect cancers, by
consumers to optimize their search for products, and by financial advisors to provide
advice.

189. See, e.g., Lin. supra note 165 (noting that humans are presumed to be able to make
ethieal judgments, whereas computers have an untested track record).
190. See generally M achine Eti lies (Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson eds., 2011).
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The legal system will not be immune from this trend. We have suggested through
out this Article that this technological revolution will dramatically alter the founda
tional structure of law as we know it. Predictive technology will generate greater ex
ante information that can be used by lawmakers to write highly specific, complex
laws. And individuals will receive notice of these complex laws in a simple form
thanks to technological advances in communication. This will be the death of rules
and standards and the rise of microdirectives.
These developments will have profound implications for the role of judges, leg
islators, regulators, lawyers, and individuals in the legal system. But beyond that, we
will have to change the way we think and talk about law. Take, for example, the
classic debate between legal realists and legal formalists.191 Without ex post adjudi
cation, this debate changes radically. As standards disappear and judges have pro
gressively less influence, legislative intent will be entrenched and concretized in the
catalog of microdirectives.
Technological changes that vastly improve ex ante information will also breathe
new life into old law-and-economics models that began with an assumption that law
makers and citizens have full information. Friction in these models caused by imper
fect and asymmetric information has provided a fertile source of material for critics,
both inside and outside the field of law and economics. But these models will be
given renewed importance. Similarly, the public choice literature will have an in
creased emphasis on how legislators choose objectives, rather than how they imple
ment laws, while academic interest in subjects such as judicial behavior will
dissipate.
All of this is to say that legal institutions of all types will change radically. We
are witnessing an information revolution. And, like other technological revolutions,
it will precede a legal revolution. The industrial revolution, for example, saw human
labor replaced by machine labor and the cost of transportation fell markedly with
inventions such as the steam engine. It greatly reduced transaction costs and had
widespread impact on all spheres of law including contract law,192 property law,191

191. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, B eyond the Formalist-R ealist D ivide: T he
of Politics in J udging (2010); Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist and Instrumentalist
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 C al. L. Rev. 119(1985). On American legal realism,
see G rant G ilmore, T he A ges of A merican Law (2d ed. 2012); W ilfred E. Rumble, J r .,
A merican Legal Realism (1968); Robert Samuel S ummers, Instrumentalism and
A merican Legal T heory (1982); Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in A Companion to
Philosophy of L aw and Legal T heory (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010); Karl N. Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev . 1222 (1931).
On formalism, see generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Y ale L.J. 509 (1988); Ernest
J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality o f Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949 (1988).
192. See, e.g., P S . A tiyah,T h e R iseand Fa l l o f Freedomof C ontract (1979);G rant
G ilmore, Origins, in T he D eath of Contract 5 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
193. For example, to see the feedback effect between intellectual property and the indus
trial revolution, see Joel Mokyr, Intellectual Property Rights, the Industrial Revolution, and
the Beginnings o f Modern Economic Growth, 99 A m. Econ. R ev. 349 (2009).
Role
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employment law, 194 criminal law, 195 and tort law. 196
The information revolution has already resulted in dramatic changes in the world
of commerce. For example, companies such as YouTube, Uber, and Airbnb have
disrupted and uprooted heavily regulated and stable industries. The coming techno
logical revolution will lead to similar disruption of the legal services industry, but
the effect on law will be much deeper and far wider. It will affect the very structure
of legal commands and the way we, as a society, choose to govern the behavior of
citizens.

194. See, e.g., ClarkNardinelli, Child Labor and the Factory Ads, 40 J. ECON. Hist. 739 (1980).
195. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Yoram Barzel, The Evolution o f Criminal Law and
Police During the Pre-Modern Era, 27 J.L. Econ . & O rg. 540 (2011).
196. See, e.g., Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J.

Legal Stud. 403 (1974).
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